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PREFACE 
At the time of this writing, the two major tension areas in the 
world are Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Particularly in the Mid-
dle East, there is a possibility that one rash move by either the 
United States or the Soviet Union will result in a nuclear holocaust. 
It was thought that valuable insights into the present-day United 
States policy in the Middle East could be gained by exploring a major 
United States policy in the Middle East--the Eisenhower Doctrine. 
I should like to express my gratitude to Professor Harold V. Sare 
for his inspiration of this study and guidance in the preparation of 
.the thesis. I should also like to thank Dr. Raymond Ha bi by for his 
helpful conunents and criticisms. Finally, I wish to express my grati-
tude and sincere appreciation to. Dr. Clifford A.L. Rich, without whom, 
I would never have been able to pursue a graduate degree at Oklahoma 
State University. 
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Whenever a government formulates a foreign policy, it is assumed 
that the policy is based on the government's concept of national inter-
est. Also, the implementation of the policy is dependent upon what-
ever is considered to be in the national interest as implementation 
proceeds. Therefore, whenever national interests are endangered by a 
particular policy, it must be assumed that the government will withdraw 
or change the policy. The determination of the objectives related to 
· national interest is a constant process and changes can be expected to 
take place in reference to new circumstances that might develop over a 
period of time. When new circumstances develop and a policy does not 
change, the policy becomes rigid and of dubious value to the nation 
which promulgates it. These premises establish criteria for examining 
any particular policy formulated by a nation. In this study, these 
criteria will be used to examine the Eisenhower Doctrine. 
In 1957, the Middle Eastern policy of the United States was de-
signed to realize a number of objectives which were thought to contri-
bute to national security and well being. Amon.g these were the main-
tenance of military primacy in the region, the uninterrupted flow of 
oil, the preservation of the independence of the established states, 
and the promotion of foreign policies favorable to the Western bloc by 
the governments of the Middle Eastern states. One policy devised by 
1 
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the United States to further these interests in the Middle East is 
found in the Eisenhower D.octrine. The announced objective of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine was to protect the political independence and ter-
ritorial integrity of the states of the Middl~ East against inter-
national communist armed aggression. To meet this objective, the Presi-
dent was authorized by Congress to undertake economic and military 
assistance programs with any government in the general area. He was 
also given greater discretion in the disposition of $200 million which 
previously had been appropriated by the Congress. The Congressional 
Resolution containing the Doctrine stated that: 
••• the United States regards as vital to the national 
interest and world peace the preservation of the inde-
pendence and integrity of the nations of the Middle 
East. To this end, if the President determines the 
necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to 
use armed forces to assist any nation or groups of 
such nations requesting assistance against armed ag-
gression from any country controlled by international 
communism~ •• 1 
By December, 1958, the Eisenhower Doctrine was, for all practical 
purposes, dead. It did not prevent further Soviet penetration of the 
Middle East, but rather, increased it, thus threatenihg the military 
primacy of the United States in the region. The Doctrine particularly 
estranged the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) who, because of 
its control of the Suez Canal and the oil pipelines to the Mediterran-
ean Sea, was in a position to interrupt the flow of oil from the Middle 
East. Finally, it impeded attempts to promote among Arab governments 
foreign policies favorable to the Western bloc. 
1Paul E. Zinner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations-
1957 (New York, 1958), p. 206. 
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.:I. This study will investigate the reasons why the Eisenhower Doc-
trine by 1958 had ceased to contribute to the realization of objectives 
which would protect the national interest. An attempt will be made to 
What were the reactions of the states in Middle East to the Doctrine? 
Did the Eisenhower Doctrine fail because of unanticipated reactions to 
•·~~~~·.;;;;:,'.;,,;i<·I<" _,.~,..~•·-·---• 
its implementation by some key Arab states? 
':!'' ,.,,.;~~;:,.,• .,.,_...,.~..Jl.;~,;.:;·:,,..-f'··-, •'•~:.:'°..:,·~:;~~.;;,~":.~::~,,"''>'"-",.,_,O'-C\•'~•·•"-:"'' ~'~'!,;~).~ ... 
In an effort to provide tentative answers to these questions, this 
study will assert that the major objective of the Eisenhower Doctrine 
was to isolate Egypt, under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, from the 
other Arab governments. The United States believed that the policies 
of Nasser constituted a threat to the independence of certain Arab 
governments, and thereby, to the United States. This proposition is 
based on the Doctrine's military and economic aid provisions which made 
it unlikely that it would be used directly against the Soviet Union, 
but suggested that it was probable that it would be used against Egypt. 
In additioris Nasser's opposition to the recognition of Israel, his 
leadership of the Arab nationalist movement, which posed a threat to 
Western oil interests through expropriation, and his opposition to 
Western-oriented defensive alliances against the Soviet Union in the 
Middle East, sugge.sted that he was antagonistic to the interests of the 
United States. Also, Nasser was the first Arab leader to turn to the 
Soviet :Union for military assistance and his actions encouraged other 
Arab governments to do the same. This permitted the Soviet Union to 
militarily penetrate the Middle East, which threatened the military 
primacy of the United States in the area. 
The Arab governments became alienated from the United States 
,.. 
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because they believed that the United States was continuing the imper-
ialist policies of Great Britain and France. It was immediately clear 
to the Arabs that the United States was using the Doctrine primarily 
against· the Arab nationalists and not the communists. This was sub~ 
stantiated in their minds when the United States attempted to isolate 
Egypt, bribe friendly Arab states to oppose other Arab states, and used 
the Sixth Fleet to intimidate Arab governments. 
The Eisenhower Doctrine ceased to be a viable foreign policy in 
the Middle East after 1958 because it failed 'to isolate Egypt, and in-
stead, created overwhelming Arab hostility against the United States. 
By December, 1958, there was not one Arab government which could be 
called pro-Western. On the other hand, all of the Arab governments 
could be classified as nonali~ned~ This indicated a victory for 
President Nasser's position; he thereby gained prestige among the 
Arabs. Nasser's increased prestige, the demise of pro-Western govern-
ments, and Arab hostility toward the United States seriously under-
mined the national interests of the United States in 1958. This in-
creased threat to the national interests in the Middle East can be re-
lated to the Eisenhower Doctrine; in these terms, the policy was not 
E is en.~~~L.~?.5;.~};.!.n.~ .. -~a.~ ... t.Q.N"t§.2.lj!f~e,,.,[g,y.Jtt~~l\2..J>Le.a~;i;~.t.h,~ .... ,§,t,a,t~Y.§.,,.S,\!O 
~ ;l;i;i,.Wl;Q'1{ 1fg£jifit~.~ ... ~.£.2;t;..il~JLi,,s, it will be necessary to ~·~~y 
several eremises implied i.n t.h~,,ml:!-J<?};: .... hXJl.2~lu~,§.i.s· First, this study 
.....__._~,..~--,;:~,-._.....,,,,,.._·,·.;..o,;r.i.,.!J-M•"'""' 
will attempt to show that there was little threat of direct Soviet ag-
gression in the Middle East and that Soviet subversion was not a major 
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threat in 1957. Also, this study will attempt to show that Egypt was 
an immediate threat to the national interests of the United States in 
the Middle East because Arab governments were under intense pressure to 
support a policy of Pan-Arab nationalism advocated by President Nasser, 
which was antagonistic to the United States and its Western allies. 
Arab governments identified the status quo policy of the United States 
with earlier Anglo-French imperialist policies, and this intensified 
Arab hostility. 
The term "Middle East" has several definitions. Some authorities 
define the Middle East to include those Arab states located between the 
Medit.erranean Sea and Asia. Others believe the entire Eastern Mediter-
ranean area, including Turkey and Iran, to be the Middle East. The 
statement of the Eisenhower Doctrine reflects no specific delimitation 
of area, but Secretary of State John Foster Dulles included Greece and 
Turkey to the north, Morocco to the west, Pakistan to the east, and 
Sudan to the south, within the scope of the Eisenhower Doctrine. This 
study will focus upon the Arab states of the Eastern Mediterranean 
area. The scope will be restricted to the period from January 1, 1957, 
to December 30, 1958. This covers the period during which the Eisen-
hower Doctrine was formulated, implementation attempted, and Arab re-
actions to it materialized. 
~ Much of the literature on the Eisenhower Doctrine, including this 
study, view the Doctrine as a part of the stiltus quo policy of the 
United States in the Middle East. This study differs by arguing that 
the Eisenhower Doctrine was primarily directed against Egypt and not 
the Soviet Union. For example, Paul Hanna viewed the purpose of the 
Doctrine to be that of deterrin'g the aggressive aims of the Soviet 
6 
Union and reassuring the Baghdad Pact members. In this sense, it is 
viewed as a restatement of the Truman Doctrine. Hanna viewed the Arab 
reaction to the Eisenhower Doctrine as a side effect rather than as a 
. 2 
direct result of the policy. Thomas Finletter argued that the doctrine 
attempted to split the Arab world between pro-Western regimes and re-
~ 3 
gimes that looked to Cairo for leadership and Moscow for support. Fin-
letter's· emphasis, however, was on the Soviet threat which he believed 
existed in the Middle East. John C. Campbell, in his book Defense of 
~ Middle ~' implied that the Eisenhower Doctrine may have been 
primarily oriented against Egypt, but concluded that the Doctrine ex-
tended the West's diplomatic warning system to the Middle East. 4 In ef-
feet, Campbell also resorted to the argument that the Middle East was 
in grave danger of Soviet aggression or subversion. 
_____ T_h_e_~-~do}o~y of S.~is ~.,;idy .. wil1,he...~Lca1 ~nd. .Q,~~~,t~. 
The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Arab response to it will be analyzed 
within the framework of what was perceived to be the national interests 
of the United States in 1957. Chapter II will present background on 
the national interests of the United States in the Middle East, the po-
litical environment of the region in 1957, United States polities prior 
to 1957, and the reasons for the United States' initiative in 1957. In 
the course of this chapter, it will be shown that the United States 
consistently favored status quo policies for the Middle East. 
· ~aul L. Hanna, "America in the Middle East", Middle Eastern Af-
fairs, Vol. X, No. 5 (May, 1959), p. 184. 
3Thomas K. Finletter, Foreign Policy: The Next Phase - ~ 1960s 
(New York, 1960), p. 160. 
4 John c. Campbell, Defense .2f the Middle East (New York, 1960), p. 
169. 
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While the announced purpose of the Eisenhower Doctrine was to con-
tain the communist '~threat" ·to the Middle East, Chapter III will at-
tempt to show that this threat was not a serious one, but that Egypt 
did pose an immediate threat to the interest of the United States in 
th~ Middle East. This chapter will try to verify that the major pur-
pose of the Eisenhower Doctrine was to isolate Egypt. 
Chapter IV will attempt to show that the Arab governments became 
antagonized toward the United States over the Eisenhower Doctrine be-
cause it clearly pursued the status quo by directing the policy against 
the Arab nationalists. This will be done by a careful analysis of the 
reasons why some of the Arab governments accepted the aid extended 
under the Doctrine, and others did not. In addition, this chapter will 
explore the reasons for Arab hostility toward the Eisenhower Doctrine 
which resulted from attempts by the United States to implement it. The 
- last chapter will presen_t conclusions concerning the utility of the 
Doctrine in realizing objectives of the United States. 
This study will depend upon such primary sources as the ~ ~ 
Times, the Department of State Bulletin, the Congressional Record, and 
- the Hearings by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services 
Committees. In combination with the above primary·sources, secondary 
sources will be utilize_d for indications of Arab reaction and ramifi-
cation of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Various professional journals will 
also be used to obtain interpretations - Political Science Quarterly, 
Middle Eastern Affairs, the Middle East Journal, International Journal, 
... · .. - . 
~-Western Political Science Quarterly, Survey of International Af-
_fairs, _and Foreign Affairs. 
In the East-West conflict, neither side has been willing to 
8 
concede the Middle East to the other, which indicates that both find 
the region vitally important to their national interests. The United 
States' objectives in 1957 in the Middle East continue to be pursued. 
The fundamental problems of the Middle East in 1957 still exist today. 
However, the influence and involvement of the Soviet Union have in-
creased substantially and the influence of the United States has become 
more precarious. This study is significant because it will reveal the 
unsound basis of past policies of the United States and thereby should 
contribute to the development of more viable policies in the future. 
CHAPTER II 
THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
Innnediately following World War II, the United States did not as-
sume a major role in the Middle East because Great Britain, a wartime 
ally, was dominant there. Great Britain had urged the United States to 
share her burden in the Middle East, but the United States was reluc-
1 tant to do so. However, it was not long until events occurred whi,ch 
compelled the United States to become involved. 
These events centered around the post-World War II aims of the 
Soviet Union. In 1945 and 1946, the Soviet Union demanded that Turkey 
c;:ede two of the latter's eastern provinces, Kars and Ardahan, to the 
Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet Union demanded special privileges 
from Turkey in the administration of the Dardanelles, a narrow channel 
joining the Sea of Marmara to the Aegean Sea, and the Straits of Bos-
porus, a channel joining the Sea of Marmara to the Black Sea. Great 
Britain, who historically had sought to deny Russia control over the 
Dardanelles and the Straits, supported Turkey in resisting the Soviet 
demands •. During the same period of time, the Soviet Union had refused 
to participate in the supervision of elections in Greece, but aide4 the 
Greek Connnunist Party in its attempt to overthrow the Greek government. 
Great Britain, again, took the lead in supporting.the Greek government. 
1william R. Polk, The United States and theArab World (Cambridge, 
. Massachusetts, 1965), p:-263. -- -- --
9 
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A crisis was also developing in Iran. In a 1942 agreement among Great 
Britain, lran, and the Soviet Union, Soviet troops were authorized to 
be stationed: in Azerbaijan, a northern province of Iran, until six 
months after the War was concluded. In 1946, the United States Depart-
ment of State reported to President Truman that the Soviet Union ap-
peared to have no intention of leaving Azerbaijan but, instead, was re-
2 inforcing its garrison there. The United States joined Great Britain 
in presenting a united front against this Russian threat. 
In Iran, the United States, through diplomatic channels and in the 
United Nations Security Council, applied pressure upon the Soviet Union 
to withdraw its troops. Although the attempt to work through the 
United Nations failed because of the Soviet veto, it did call the 
world's attention to the situation and by December, 1946, the. Iranian 
G . d 1 Ab"" 3 overnment regaine contra over zer aiJan. Meanwhile, unforeseen 
circumstances forced the United States to become more involved not only 
in Greece and Turkey, but also in the entire Middle East. Great Britain 
was economically devastated as a result of World War II and, in 1946, 
it became obvious it could no longer maintain a large military commit-
ment around the world and particularly in the Middle East. The United 
States was informed in February, 1947, by the British Government that 
Great Britain would no longer take primary responsibility for the de-
fense of Greece and Turkey. The United States was requested to assume 
the burden. This prompted the formulation of the Truman Doctrine, 
which served to warn the Soviet Union that the United States would not 
2Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. II 
(Garden City, New York, 1956), p. 93. 
3Ibid., PP• 93-95. 
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condone any further Soviet expansion in Europe and the Mediterranean. 
With its increased involvement in world affairs, the United States 
found that one major problem was to contain the Soviet Union's pene-
tration of the Middle East. 4 The Truman Doctrine was the first enunci-
ation of the containment policy. Its rationale was provided by George 
Kennan. He pointed out that the Russians, always fearful of foreign 
contact, had learned to seek security by destroying their rivals. But 
they had demonstrated caution in doing so, and if barriers were placed 
in their path, they would adjust to them. Kennan argued that " ••• the 
main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must 
be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of 
5 Russian expansive te.ndencies." To achieve this end, the United States 
began to promote bilateral security treaties and alliance systems. 
In 1946, a problem of a different sort confronted the United 
States. Great Britain held Palestine as a mandate under the League of 
Nations •... In 1917, the British Government under the Balfour Declaration 
had supported the idea of establishing a national home for the.Jewish 
people in Palestine, but the 1946 political situation in the Middle 
East was not conducive to honoring this pledge. President Truman, who 
personally directed the Palest·ine policy of the United States, 6 believed 
that: his government could not stand by while the European Jewish 
4Ibid., p. 102. 
5 
. George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (New York, 1951), 
pp. 98-99.' 
6 D.ean Acheson, Present !l the Creation (New York, 1969), p·. 169. 
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refugees were being denied opportunities to resettle. 7 He believed that 
the human misery of the .Jewish refugees must be relieved and that Great 
8 Britain 1 s promise to the Jews must be kept. 
With Truman's pressure on Great Britain to keep its cormnitment, 
the situation in Palestine deteriorated rapidly, and the British were 
caught in a crossfire between the Jews and Atabs. Finding itself un-
able to cope with a problem that was becoming increasingly more diffi-
cult, Great Britain, in February, 1947, informed the United Nations 
that it would surrender its mandate by August 1., 1948. The British 
left the solution of the Palestine conflict to the United Nations. The 
United Nations solution was to divide Palestine and give a portion of 
it to the Jews for the establishment of the State of Israel. The 
United States voted for the partition of Palestine and the creation of 
the State of Israel. United States support for Israel was indicated by 
the irmnediate extension of de facto recognition when the Provisional 
Government of Israel was established on May 14, 1948. President Truman 
extended recognition of the Provisional Government within eleven min-
9 
utes after Israel had been proclaimed a state. 
The policy of the United States in support of the creation of 
Israel antagonized the Arabs. The Governments of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, 
and Saudi Arabi.a believed that Truman's policies toward Palestine con-
stituted a reversal of oral and verbal cormnitments which previously had 
7 Truman, p. 140. 
8Ibid., p. 157. 
9rbid., p. 164.~ 
13 
. 10 been made to them by President Roosevelt. Even within the Truman Ad-
ministration, there was dissent over the Palestine policy. 11 In his 
memoirs, however, Truman states that he was primar.i ly motivated by hu-
manitarian considerations rather than possible future security consid-
. 12 
erat1ons. 
After the establishment of Israel, one of the lasting problems in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict concerned boundaries. The Arabs rejected the 
13 1947 United Nations partition plan and soon after the establishment 
of the State of Israel, Arab and Israeli armies clashed. During the 
war, Israel was able to conquer large portions of Arab Palestine. The 
Egyptian-Israeli Armistice which ended the 1948 war left Israel in c.on-
14 
trol of most of the territory which it had conquered. The war had 
humiliated the Arabs and some of them desired revenge. In an attempt 
to maintain peace and stability in the area, the United States joined 
with Great Britain and France in 1950 in issuing the Tripartite Declar-
~tion which declared that they would refuse to sell arms to any Middle 
10 Acheson, p. 171. 
Truman, p. 148. 
New York Times, October 19, 1945, p. 4. 
United States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XV, No. 384 
(November 10, 1946), pp. 848-849. 
11walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), pp. 
344, 363. 
Truman, p. 149. 
Acheson, p. 169. 
12 Truman, pp. 140, 157. 
13John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East (New York, 1960), 
p. 323. 
14 
u .. s. Congress, Senate, ! Select Chronology and Background Docu-
ments Relating~ the Middle East (Washington, D.Co, 1969), P• 125. 
14 
East nation planning aggression. Furthermore, the Declaration stated 
that they were opposed to the use of force or the threat of force by 
15 
any of the states in the area. This placed the United States in op-
position to any military solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Beginning in the early 1950's, the United States was seeking an 
alliance system in the Middle East. As a result of the Truman Doctrine, 
the North Atlantic Pact, the ANZUS Pact, the Japanese Security Tr~a~y 
with the United States, and the Korean conflict, the United States by 
1951 had either military bases of alliances surrounding the Soviet 
Union except in the Middle East. In an atte.mpt to remedy this gap, the 
United States in 1951 proposed .a Middle East Defense Command which 
would combine all the Middle Eastern nations in an alliance against 
"d . 16 outsi e aggression. The primary responsibility for regional defense 
would rest with Great Britain, but Egypt would furnish facilities for 
h . . 17 t e organization. The Egyptian army would be trained and armed by 
Great Britain and the British base at Suez would be turned over to 
Egypt with the understanding that it would simultaneously become an 
Allied base. 18 Unfortunately for the United States, the proposal was 
made at a time when the Egyptian Government was denouncing Great Bri-
tain 1 s control of the Suez Canal. The Egyptian leadership immediately 
rejected the plan, believing ~t a subtle attempt to retain British in-
19 fluence in Egypt. Although the United States persisted in its 
15Ibid., p. 182. 
't6 
· Acheson, p. 563. 
17Ibid., pp. 563-565. 
18 Campbell, pp. 41-42. 
19 
Ibid., p. 43. 
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efforts until the end of the Truman Administration, it failed to secure 
any alliance. 
When the Eisenhower Administration took office in 1953, the Middle 
East situation remained the same; there continued to be a gap in the 
ring of bases surrounding the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1953, 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles headed a fact-finding mission to 
the Middle East and reported that most MidcUe Eastern governments were 
unwilling to associate with the West in a defensive alliance but that 
the states of the "northern tier" were more aware of the Soviet menace 
and probably would participate in a defensive pact. 20 The United 
States thus persuaded Turkey and Iraq to negotiate a mutual defense 
treaty which became known as the Baghdad Pact. The Pact was later 
joined by Great Britain, Pakistan, and Iran. The Baghdad Pact was im-
mediately denounced by President Nasser and the leadership of the Arab 
League because Iraq, the only Arab member, had broken its agreement 
with the Arab League that required Arab states not to enter an alliance 
21 
with-non.-Arab states. From that period until July, 1958, the Iraqi 
Government was subjected to torrents of verbal abuse by Radio Cairo and 
P . d N f 11 . . lf . h G B · · 22 resi ent asser or a ying itse wit reat ritain. 
In 1956, in response to the refusal of the United States and Great/ 
Britain to provide financial assistance for construction of the Aswan V 
20united States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXVIII (June 
15, 1953), pp. 831-835.' 
21Ann Williams, Britain and France .!.!!. the Middle East and North 
Africa (New York, 1968), p. ll6. 
22 F.R.C. Bagley, "Iraq To-Day", International Journal, Vol. XII, 
No. 3 (Summer, 1957), p. 207. 
16 
Dam, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal. Great Britain and France, major 
stockholders in the Canal, were concerned that Nasser would exact con-
cessions from them and they concluded that Nasser's government must be 
23 
overthrown. Israel, smarting from Arab guerrilla attacks and realiz-
ing that the withdrawal of British troops gave Egypt a freer hand for 
action in Palestine, found its interests complementing those of Great 
Britain and France. France, in September and October, sent consider-
able military equipment to Israel and by late October, Israel had 
agreed to cooperate with Grea_t Britain and France in overthrowing Nas-
24 
ser's government. On October 29, Israel attacked the Sinai Penin-
sula, claiming that it had taken necessary measures to destroy Egyptian 
commando bases. The next day, an Anglo-French ultimatum was issued to 
the Israelis and the Egyptians to withdraw their forces at least ten 
miles from the canal, and permit British, and French troops to enter the 
25 Canal Zone to insure free passage. This ultimatum was ignored and 
France and Great Britain took military action. 
The United States refused to c~ndone the attacks of Great Britain, 
France, and Israel, but instead, condemned them as aggressors. Faced 
with the united opposition of the United States and the Soviet Union, 
a growing uneasiness in Great Britain over the venture, and unlikeli-
hood of toppling the Nasser regime, the British and French accepted a 
23williams, p. 125. 
24 Anthony Moncri~ff, ed., Suez Ten Years After (New York, 1968), 
p. 95. 
Williams, p. 127. 
25 U.S. Congress, Senate, A Select Chronology- and Background Docu-
ments Relating !£. the Middle East, p. 6. 
17 
a ceasefire on November 7 and withdrew all of their forces by December 
22, 1956. The United States was instrumental in persuading Is;rael to 
26 
withdraw from the territory it had seized during the war. 
As a result of its actioris, Great Britain's influence and leader-
ship in the Middle East were severely damaged. The crisis also nulli-
fied the Tripartite Declaration, as Great Britain and France . .informed 
. 27 the United States that they were no longer obligated by its terms. By 
December, 1956, the only powerful Western nation having influence in 
the Middle East was the United States who had gained prestige by con-
demning the aggression. At the same time, the Soviet Union also gained 
prestige not only by condemning the aggression, but also because it had 
suggested that troops be sent to aid the Egyptians. Finally, the crisis 
served to enhance the image of President Nasser, who became recognized 
by Arab nationalists as a leader irt the fight against imperialism. 
President Eisenhower believed that the Suez crisis and the British 
withdrawal created a vacuum in the Middle East, a vacuum which the 
United States had to fill. 28 In order to fill that vacuum, the Secre-
tary of State, John Foster Dulles, began to formulate the Eisenhower 
Doctrine. Since any nation's policies are based on its government's 
concept of national interest, the national interest of the United 
States in 1957 must be examined. 
26Ibid., pp. 155-159. 
27 U•S. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal £!!. lli Middle East, 
Hearings before the Conunittee on Foreign Relations and Conunittee on 
Armed Services, 85th Congress, I.st Session (Washington, D.C., 1957), 
p. 100. . 
28n . h D E . h W P 
· wig t • isen ower, aging eace 1956-1961. (New York, 1965), 
p. 179. 
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As with all countries, the primary national interest of the United 
States was its national security. Defined in terms of long-range goals 
for the Middle East, the leadership of the United States believed that 
the national security could best be promoted by stabilizing conditions 
in the Middle East. For example, the Suez crisis created conditions 
which made the Middle East highly unstable. The concept of Middle 
Eastern stability colored much of the post-World War II policy of the 
United States. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State in the Truman Admini-
stration, expressed it as a goal; 29 it is found in the Tripartite Dec-
laration;30 and it is also found in the title of the Joint Resolution 
upon which the Eisenhower Doctrine is based. 31 President Eisenhower, 
in a letter to the Prime Minister of Israel in 1957, wrote~ 
It has always been the view of this Government that ••• 
there should bea united effort by all of the nations to 
bring about conditions in the area more stable, more tran-
quil, and more conducive to the general welfare than those 
which existed heretofore.32 
At the same time, Henry Cabot Lodge, the United States Ambassador to 
the United Nations, stated that it was the policy of the United States 
33 
"• •• to bring o:rder and stability to this troubled area." Assistant 
Secretary of State Robert C. Hill argued that the Eisenhower Doctrine 
29 Acheson, p. 501. 
30 
·U .. S. Congres:;;, Senate,~ Select Chronology and Background Docu-
ments Relating to the Middle East, p. 132. 
31Ibid., p. 151. 
32Ibid., p. 169. 
33Ibid., p. 168. 
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was " ••• an essential step toward the cherished goal of stability. u34 
To the United States government, stability was synonymous with the 
status quo. Although not antagonistic to all change, the United States 
government was fearful that any major changes in the Middle East would 
impair its national interests. The Suez crisis, for example, was 
viewed as creating unstable conditions i.n the Middle East because Brit-
ish influence was severely damaged and the influence of Egypt and the 
Soviet Union had incr~ased. Traditionally, the policy of the status 
quo aims at the maintenance of the distribution of power which exists 
. 35 
at a particular moment in history. The United States, in 1957, did 
not want either Egypt or the Soviet Union to gain further influence in 
the Middle East but wished to maintain.the political environment which 
was then present in the region. This can be more clearly shoii>n:'f by in-
specting the immediate objectives of the United States in the Middle 
East which were thought to contribute to the national interest. All of 
these immediate aims dictated a status quo policy. 
Perhaps the foremost objective of the United States was to main~ 
tain its military superiority in the Middle East. It had acquired mil-
ita;i::y bases in Li.bya~ Saudi Arabi.a, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. In ad-
dition. the United States had its Sixth Fleet patrolling the Mediter-
ranean Sea. Although not a member of the Baghdad Pact, it had close 
associations with the members and was allied with Great Britain and 
Turkey through NATO. Its military primacy placed the United States in 
34Uni.ted States Department of State Bulletin, "A Step. Toward Sta-· 
bility in the Middle East", Address by Robert C. Hi.11, Vol. :XXXVI, No. 
918 (January 28, 1957), p. 134. 
35 Hans J • Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (3rd ed., New York, 
1966), p. 40. 
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a position where it could act as a bulwark against any possible Soviet 
aggression and, at the same time, realistically work toward stabilizing 
the Middle Eastern political environment. 
Another immediate aim of the United States was to maintain the un-
interrupted flow of oil from the Middle Eastern oil fields to Western 
markets. In 1956 the Middle East accounted for seventy per cent of the 
36 
world's proven oil reserves. While Middle East oil constituted less 
37 . than four per cent of the American crude oil demand, American com-
panies had profitable inyestments in Middle Eastern oil production. 38 
The United States Government, responsive to the wishes of its citizens 
and aware of the value of these investments to its balance of payments, 
sought to protect these interests. There is another, and perhaps more 
important, reason for seeking to protect the flow of Middle Eastern 
oil. If the United States did not depend ~pon Middle Eastern oil, its 
European allies did. Seventy-five per cent of Western Europe's oil im-
ports were supplied by the Middle East. 39 If the flow of Middle Eastern 
oil were halted, Western Europe would ha"Ve to rely on either the United 
States or the Soviet Union for its oil. Both possibilities would be 
damaging to the national security of the United States because it could 
not meet Western Europe's needs for an extended period of time without 
creating shortages for itself and because Western Europe's dependence 
36u.s. Congress, Senate, President's :Proposal .Q!!. the Middle East, 
p. 32. 
37Ibid., p. 35. 
38Ibid. 
3911Committee Analysis of the Problem", Congressional Digest, Vol. 
XXXVI (1957), p: 68. 
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on Soviet oil would impair its effectiveness as an ally. The interest 
of the United States in the uninterrupted flow of Middle Eastern oil to 
Western Europe was expressed by the State Department in response to a 
series of questions sent to it by Senator Fulbright: "It is correct to 
say that a principal sec_u,rity interest in the Middle East is to assure 
40 petroleum resources are available to the allies in time of war.',' 
The United States had two other innnediate objectives in the Middle 
East. One was the preservation of the independence of the established 
states in the region, and· the other was the promotion of foreign poli-
cies favorable to the United States. The United States did not want 
any centralized control over- the Middle East because such control would 
impair its interests. In this sense, the Pan-Arab movement of Presi-
dent Nasser and the Soviet Union were possible threats to the indepen-
dence of the governments of the Middle East. The United States also 
·believed that by insuring the independence of the various- Middle East-
ern governments, it could convince these governments that it was to 
.their advantage to ally themselves with the United States. By late 
1956, the United States was successful in securing an informal alliance 
of interests between itself and Lebanon, Saudi Arabi, and Iraq. Thus, 
by promoting foreign policies that were favorable to the United States, 
it could protect its interests in the Middle East. 
If these objectives of the United States dictated pursuit of the 
status quo, there were two threats .to the status quo in the Middle 
East. One of these threats came from the Soviet Union. In 1957, the 
Soviet Union increased. its prestige in the area following its 
40u.s. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal£!!. the Middfe ~' 
p. 31. 
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denunciation of the tripartite invasion of 1956 and its sale of arms to 
Egyp-t and Syria. The Soviets also began to propagandize against Israel 
and this increased their standing among the Arabs. These events re-
fleeted the increased Soviet penetration of the area and challenged the 
containment policy of the United States. This increased Soviet atten-
tion to Egypt and Syria had a strong rationale. Egypt controlled the 
Suez Canal; Syria controlled all the pipelines to the Mediterranean 
41 Sea. If Egypt and Syria became conununist-dominated, the flow of Mid-
dle Eastern oil to Europe could be interrupt~d. 
Another threat to the aims of the United States was President Nas-
ser of Egypt. In 1956, the Arab nationalist movement "· •• seems to have 
42 been captured by Gamal Abdel Nasser." As the leader of the Arab na-
tionalist movement, President Nasser, in the view of the United States, 
posed a potential threat to the stability of the Middle East. He had 
allowed the Soviet Union to penetrate the region by buying arms in 
1955, and he began playing the~nited States off against the Soviet 
Union in order to realize his own ambitions. If Nasser gave the Soviet 
Union a naval base br air base in Egypt, the military primacy of the 
United States in the Middle East would be challenged and the contain-
rnent policy in the Middle East would be threatened. Nasser was also in 
a position, because of his control of the Suez Canal, to impede the 
flow of oil through the Canal. Furthermore, he was a nationalist and 
some nationa_list groups had advocated expropriating Western oil 
41 Campbell, pp. 254-255. 
42John C. Campbell, "From Doctrine to Policy in the Middle East", 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXV (July, 1957), p. 446. 
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concessions in the Middle East. 43 Nasser, in his book Egypt's Libera-
!l:.2.!l, had suggested that Arab oil should be used as the economic power 
behind the Arab Nation rather than letting the "imperialists" control· 
it. 44 Although Nasser had not attempted to expropriate any oil con-
cessions, oil producers in the United States planned to curb their ex-
pansion in January, 1957, because they feared Nasser's ability to create 
trouble in the area and because they were worried by Arab nationalist 
45 
rumors that oil properties would be expropriated. There was also the 
threat posed by both the Soviet Union .and Egypt to subvert the govern-
ments of other Middle East states. Nasser, through his denunciation of 
Iraq when it joined the Baghdad Pact, had already indicated that the 
Arab states must remain nonaligned, and that he was prepared to unleash 
his propaganda upon any Arab government that followed pro-Western poli-
cies. The Soviet Union, for its part, was attempting to prolong any 
unstable situation which might occur in the Middle East because such in-
stability would allow it to gain supporters. 
In order to further its interests in the Middle East, and in light 
of the two threats to those interests which existed, the United States 
formulated the Eisenhower Doctrine. It remains to be determined which 
of the two threats the United States considered to be most s.erious in 
1957. 
43sylvia G. Haim, ed., ~.Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley, 
California, 1964), pp. 237 -241. 
44 Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt's Liberation (Washington, 1955), PP• 
108-109. 
45New York Times, January 2, 1957, p. 16. 
CHAPTER Ill 
SHAPlNG OF THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE 
President Eisenhower called Congressional leaders to the White 
House on January 1, 1957, to brief them on his Middle East proposal. 
The President told the Congressional leaders that the United States 
needed to make its intentions clear in the Middle East and that the 
United States was determined to sustain Western "rights" in the region. 
Eisenhower argued that the existing vacuum in the Middle East must be 
filled by the United States before it was filled by the Soviet Union. 
After nearly four hours of discussion, the. Congressional leaders de-
parted, assuring the President of their support. 1 
Four days later, in a gesture designed to emphasize the urgency of 
the Middle East situation, President Eisenhower spoke to a special joint 
session of Congress where he noted the increasing Soviet danger through-
out the world and the importance of the Middle East to the United 
States. The President implied that the Soviet Union presented an im-
mediate threat to the region and he requested Congressional passage of 
a Joint Resolution which would give him support in dealing with this 
2 threat. 
1Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-1961 (New York, 1965), p. 
179. 
~aul E. Zinner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations -
1957 (New York, 1958), pp. 200-204. ,,.~ 
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After amendment by Congress, the final version of the Resolution 
which President Eisenhower signed into law had three major provisions: 
(1) the President was authorized to undertake economic and military as-
sistance programs with any nation in the Middle East desiring such as-
sistance; (2) the President, at his discretion, would use armed forces 
to assist ~ny Middle East nation requesting assistance against armed 
aggression from any country controlled by international connnunism; (3) 
the President was given greater discretion in the use of $200 million 
which had been previously appropriated by the Congress. 
In the House of Representatives, the Resolution passed easily; the 
only difficulty encountered was the substitute resolution offered by 
the Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn, which read: "The United States 
regards as vital to her interests the preservation of the independence 
and integrity of the states of the Middle East and, if necessary, will 
3 
use her armed fol;'.'ces to that end." President Eisenhower and Secretary 
of State Dulles rejected this substitute resolution, partially because 
it ·seemed an attempt to establish a United States protectorate in the 
Middle East, and partially because it contained no provisions for eco-
l 
nomic or military assistance. 4 
In the .United States Senate, the Joint Resolution met strong oppos-
ition before passage. Some Senators connnented that their mail was run-
ning eight to one against the Resolution and that many of the individu-
als who wrote questioned the candidness of the President in regard to 
3Eisenhower, p. 180. 
4Ibid.' p. 181. 
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5 
the Soviet threat to the Middle East. Senator Fulbright was suspicious 
of the proposal, saying that he believed it " ••• improvident and unwise 
to make a grant of authority to disburse large sums of public money 
without restrictions of any kind, for objectives which are vague and 
unspecified. 116 Senator Jackson of Washington had serious doubts about 
the definition of "international communism" and Secretary of State Dul-
les was unable to dispel his doubts. 7 Dean Acheson, when asked to com-
ment about the Doctrine, made this statement: "To fight an enemy that's 
not going to attack with forces that don't exist, to carry out a policy 
8 you haven't decided upon yet." Even former President Truman, after 
initially approving the Doctrine, joined'the dissenters and criticized 
9 it as being· "too little, too late." 
Much of the skepticism surrounding the Doctrine began in the Hear-
ings on the proposed Resolution. The major premise of the Doctrine was 
that the Soviet Union was an immediate threat to the Middle East and 
that this threat was two-fold: overt military aggression and/or covert 
subversion. In order to meet this threat, the United States declared 
that it would use its troops to protect the independence of the Middle 
Eastern states and that it was prepared to extend economic and miiitary 
5 ~~Times, February 1, 1957, p. 3. 
6 Tristram Coffin, Senator Fulbright: Portrait of a Public Philoso-
pher (New York, 1966), p. 126. 
7 U.S. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal .2!!. the Middle East, 
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on 
Armed Services, 85th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.c., 1957), 
p. 176. 
8New ~Times, January 7, 1957, p. 16. 
91bid •. , February 17, 1957, p. 1. 
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assistance to those Middle East states which accepted the Doctrine in 
order that they might become economically stable and, therefore, better 
able to fight Soviet subversion. The testimony provided in the Hear-
ings was never able to substantiate this premise of an immediate Soviet 
threat• 
On the contrary, there was considerable evidence that the Soviet 
Union was unlikely to commit an act of overt aggression in the Middle 
East. The troubled political situation in Poland and the revolt in 
Hungary in 1956 forced the Soviet Union to nervously watch the European 
situation and to keep its troops available for use there. Furthermore, 
in 1957, the Soviet Union did not have any allies in the area that it 
could depend on. To move troops from the Soviet Union to any non-
aligned Arab nation in a short period of time, it would have been 
necessary for the Soviet Union to violate the air space of one or more 
of the following states: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, or Pakistan. All of these 
nations were allied with either the United States or the United Kingdom. 
Any move of this nature would have immediately involved the Soviet 
Union in a confrontation with the United States that could have led to 
nuclear war. It is doubtful that the leadership of the Soviet Union 
. . 10 
felt powerful enough to be successful in such a confrontation. 
The Administration also tried to argue that communist subversion 
was an immediate threat to the Middle East. The closest that it came 
to confirming this assertion was through Admiral Radford's testimony 
that if Egypt and Syria continued to receive Soviet weapons, they would 
10 An argument against Soviet military action in the Middle East 
similar to the one presented here was given to Eisenhower by Admiral 
Radford during the Suez crisis of 1956. See Eisenhower, p. 91. 
b . d . d 11 ecome connnunist- ominate • Secretary of State Dulles implied that 
Egypt and Syria, while not at that time under the control of inter-
national connnunist leadership, they were in danger of becoming so. 12 
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Dulles, however, offered no tangible evidence to verify his assertion. 
There were implications that President Nasser and Colonel Serraj of 
Syria might be communist sympathizers, 13 but these were demolished when 
Hanson w,. Baldwin, the respected military editor of the~ York Times, 
wrote a series of articles on the Middle East in one of which he stated 
that President Nasser had outlawed the Connnunist Party in Egypt and 
that: ''Neither Nasser nor Colonel Serraj is a Cotmnunist. They are fer-
vert nationalists who probably have two pre-eminent passions; the ex-
14 
alting of Arab nationalism and the defeat of Israel." 
For the purpose of argument, suppose connnunist subversion was a 
real and innnediate danger in the Middle East•. The only course of ac-
tion then available to the United States was the $200 million mentioned 
in the Joint Resolution which could be used to bolster the economies of 
. 15 the threatened nations. The effectiveness of this $200 million to 
stop connnunist subversion can be doubted. First, since the Joint Reso-
lution was applicable to approximately twenty countries, it is conceiv-
able that many of them were threatened by connnunist subversion and this 
11 
u.s .• Congress, Senate, President's Proeosal ££ the Middle East, 
P• 410. 
121bid.' P• 249. 
131bid.' P• 650. 
14New ~ Times, January 3, 1957, P• 3. 
15u.s. Congress, Senate, President's Pro;eosal ££ lli MidcUe East, 
P• 252. 
would spread the aid rather thinly. Second, even if it was 
determine that a nation was being subverted, it can be ques1 
whether even $200 million to strengthen that nation's econo1 
effective to meet the challenge of subversion. 
Several Senators had doubts about the communist threat to the Mid-
dle East. On the floor of the Senate, Senators Ervin of North Carolina 
and Johnson of South Carolina denounced the Administration's claim of a 
communist threat to the Middle East. Senator Ervin attacked the Doc-
trine's military emphasis as unwarranted: 
When we got into the hearings we made some discoveries 
that were totally inconsistent with the releases which had 
been given to the press. We found, for example, that the 
Middle East resolution announcing the new doctrine was not, 
in fact, directed toward the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics. We found that out because the Secretary .of State 
himself testified that there was nothing to indicate that 
Soviet Russia was preparing to make any armed attack upon 
any of the nations of the Middle East.16 
Senator Johnson, in a less well-reasoned argument but still indica-
tive of what many Arabs believed, was more concerned about the "threat" 
of Soviet subversion in the Middle East: 
The myth of communistic infiltration of the Middle 
East as the reason for the President's resolution dis-
appeared before the rising sun when King Saud in one of 
his latest press releases said he did not feel that the 
Middle East was in danger of subversion from communism. 
The Arab World looks to Mecca. Russia would not dare to 
break the ties of the Arabs to prevent their facint Mecca. 
The leaders of the other Arabian countries seconded the 
note of King Saud, namely, that the Arabian countries had 
no fear of the growth of communism among them. Thus~ in 
one fell swoop, falls the scarecrow of communism. The 
Window dressing afforded by this reason - growth of com-
munism - has to be pulled aside.17 
16u.s. Congress, Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 1st Session, 
February 20, 1957, Vol. 103, Part 2, p. 2312. 
17Ib,ig., February 26, 1957, p. 2610. · 
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What then was the immediate threat to the Middle East? It does not 
appear to be "international communism." The Soviet Union had not 
introduced any new policies in the Middle East since 1955 which would 
warrant immediate response on the part of the United States. The 
Soviet Union had threatened to use "volunteers" to help Egypt during 
the Suez crisis but this was clearly a bluff. The Soviets had threaten-
ed action before but, in reality, they had never committed troops out-
side of Eastern Europe since World War II. It is true that communist 
subversion was a threat to the'governments of the Middle East, but this 
was a threat of long standing going back to 1940, when Hitler offered 
. 18 the Middle East as a zone of Soviet influence. The Eisenhower Ad-
ministration could not present any evidence that Soviet subversion had 
increased to such an extent that it was an immediate danger to the 
governments in the Middle East·. For that matter, most of the Middle 
E d "d s . h 19 ast governments 1 not sense a oviet t reat. 
If the communists did not pose an immediate threat to the Middle 
East, why would President Eisenhower call a special joint session of 
Congress, even before he gave his State of the Union address, to dis-
cuss an urgent threat to the Middle East? Why did Secretary of State 
Dulles warn the Congress that delay in passage of the Resolution would 
have serious consequences in the Middle East? 20 If the communists con-
stituted a threat of long standing, the only remaining danger, from the 
18John c. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East (New York, 1960), 
pp. 22-23. 
19campbell, p. 217. 
Eisenhower, p. 119. 
20u.s. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal£!!. the Middle East, 
p. 60. 
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point of view of the United States, must have been the threat posed by 
Egypt under President Nasser. When Nasser first came to power in 1952, 
the United States hoped to work with him21 but, by 1956, President 
Eisenhower was characterizing him as a dictator. 22 It was Nasser who 
first invited Soviet penetration in the Middle East with his arms deal 
in 1955; it was Nasser who was the symbol of Arab nationalism which was 
23 
challenging Western influence in the Middle East; and it was Nasser 
who caused a serious deterioration in relations between the United 
States and Great Britain because he nationalized the Suez Canal. It was 
Nasser who was consciously working to change the status quo in the Mid-
dle East by urging other Arab governments to buy arms from the Soviet 
Uniort, by urging the overthrow of those governments which supported pro-
Western policies, and by threatening Israel with retribution. for its 
1956 attack~ In other words, Nasser wanted to change the very condi-
tions which the United States was attempting to maintain. 24 The Eisen-
hower Administration hoped that Nasser would survive the Suez crisis in 
a mood to negotiate major Middle Eastern issues but, instead, he re-
turned to playing off the United States against the Soviet Union. 25 
Thus, it was Nasser who was a threat to the interests of the United 
States, His actions were contributing to an unstable situation in the 
Middle East, partially because of the greater threat of military action 
and partially because of the increased prestige lent to the Soviet 
21Eisenhower, p. 23. 
2211:;>id.,, P• 43. 
23lbid., P• 27. 
24Ibid., P• 25~ 
25New York Times, January 19, 1957, p. 1. 
-----·---
32 
Union. The United States did not want the Soviet Union to further 
penetrate the Middle East because it would threaten the interests of 
the United States, yet Nasser continued to allow Soviet penetration to 
occur. If the United States could isolate Nasser from the other Arab 
governments, or possibly lead to his overthrow, it would limit Soviet 
penetration and secure its national interests in the Middle East. 
The goals of the Eisenhower Doctrine appear more understandable if 
it is viewed as an instrument designed to oppose President Nasser rather 
than the communists. The economic aid in this context was to be used 
to "bribe" those Arab leaders who feared Nasser. The United States was 
going to make it worthwhile for the Arab governments to be with it 
rather than against it. In return for not supporting Nasser, the other 
Arab governments would receive economic and military assistance from the 
United St~tes. This would make the usage of the $200 million more 
practical than if it were used against Soviet subversion. Whereas 
overt Soviet aggression was difficult to contemplate, overt Egyptian 
aggression under the banner of nationalism was a distinct possibility. 26 
Certainly there was evidence that the United States was not favorably 
disposed to help President Nasser. President Eisenhower, in a letter 
to Winston Churchill in 1956 wrote:· " ••• we would have to concert our ac-
tions in making certain that he (Nasser) did not grow to be a danger to 
27 
our welfare." It is true that the United States condemned the actions 
of Great Britain, France, and Israel during the Suez crisis, but it 
also froze Egyptian assets in the United States and refused to release 
26E. h lsen ower, PP• 23-24. 
27Ibid., p. 680. 
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any of those funds for the purchase of food or medicine which were ur-
gently needed in Egypt. Furthermore, the CARE program in Egypt was 
halted and the United States refused to sell oil or surplus wheat to 
h E . 28 t e gypt1ans. The economic measures of the United States were ac-
29 
tually punitive to Egypt. 
The theory that the Eisenhower Doctrine was directed against 
President Nasser is supported by the statements of various United 
States Government officials, including the President. President 
Eisenhower attributed the decline of Western influence in the Middle 
30 East to Pan-Arabism with Nasser as its unifying symbol. Secretary of 
State Dulles said that the United States sympathized with the Arab 
unity movement as long as it was responsive to the desires of the 
people concerned and consistent with the peace and welfare of the area 
31 as a whole. Presumably, the United States would provide the criteria 
for this judgment. Under the circumstances, it would be difficult to 
contemplate support by the United States for Nasser's type of Arab na-
tionalism. Dulles later charged the nationalist movement under Nas-
ser 1 s leadership with indirect aggression. 32 !'resident Eisenhower, in 
a letter ta Chairman Khrushchev of the Soviet Union, implied that 
28 Georgiana Stevens, ed., The United States and the Middle East 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964), p. 164. - -
29Ibid., p. 24. 
30 Eisenhower, p. 27. 
31United States Department of State Bulletin, "Secretary Dulles' 
Press Conference of February ll, 1958", Vol. XXXVIII, No. 97 5 (March 3, 
1958), P• 332. 
32Ibid., "Secretary D\,llles' Press Conference of June 10, 1958", 
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 992, (June 30, 1958), P• 1089. 
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Nasser was attempting to achieve unity by indirect aggression. 33 
William Rountree, who in 1957 was Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, wrote: 
The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
nations of the Middle East are threatened by several 
factors. One of these is nationalism. This is, in it-
self, a good thing. But the banner of nationalism can 
be picked up by emotional, xenophobic, and unconstructive 
elements. In certain disturbed countries, nationalistic 
slogans are used to arouse street mobs and to terrorize 
many who work in the true interests of their nations.34 
In the New York Times, Hanson W. baldwin wrote: "The prestige of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser is probably at a new high with Arab street mobs, by which 
35 Arab governments are so often made or broken." Baldwin further com-
mented: "The Egyptian President's hold upon 'the street' in Iraq is 
strong and seems to be increasing, and even some Iraqi Army officers 
are influenced by his views. 1136 The key phrase in both Rountree's and 
Baldwin's articles was "street mobs". Rountree's use of the phrase 
seems too coincidental to suggest anything other than the fact that he 
was ref erring to President Nasser as a danger to the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the nations of the Middle East. 
To sum up, it is clear that the United States considered Nasser to 
be an extremely ambitious individual. The United States publicly sup-
ported Arab nationalism but only if it did not create unstable 
33united States, Public Papers £! the Presidents of the United 
States: Dwight~· Eisenhower - 1957 (Washington, o. c., 1958), pp. 561-
562. 
34United States Department of State Bulletin, "The Middle Eastern 
Policy of the United States", Vol. XXXVI, No. 933, May 13, 1957, p. 
756. 
35New ~Times, January 2, 1957, P• 1. 
36Ibid., p. 14. 
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conditions in the Middle East. Nasser's behavior in buying Soviet arms 
and urging the overthrow of those Arab governments which favored the 
United States did not meet the test. Furthermore, his actions made him 
a threat to the interests of the United States in the region. 
There were other evidences that the doctrine was primarily oriented 
against President Nasser. On January 1, 1957, four days before Presi-
dent Eisenhower gave his special message to the Congress, the ~York 
Times published an article concerning the consultation which had oc-
curred among the United States, Great Britain, and France over the Mid-
dle East Resolution: 
The British and French Governments have been informed 
that the proposed United States policy for the Middle East 
is not directed primarily against the creation of Soviet 
satellite states. The new United States policy, it is under-
stood, would seek to prevent aggression by any state in the 
Middle East. Under the circumstances as the British see 
them, the question is not one of military aggression, either 
by the Soviet Union or a new Soviet satellite in the Middle 
East, but of the continued infiltration of the governments 
of Arab states by nationalists sustained by Soviet financial 
aid and supported by troops armed with Soviet weapons.37 
It should be noted that only Syria and Egypt were receiving Soviet wea-
pons as of 1957. This means that Great Britain and France believed 
that the United States' policy was directed against Egypt and Syria. 
In the Senate Hearings on the Joint Resolution, Secretary of State 
Dulles commented that the doctrine would stabilize those governments 
then in control in the Middle East. 38 This supports the assumption 
that the United States intended to pursue the status quo in the Middle 
East, but also, since some Arab governments presumed that Nasser was a 
37Ibid., January 1, 1957, P• 2. 
38u.s. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal .2!l the Middle~' 
P• 416. 
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threat to their continued existance, 39 it indicates that the United 
States was going to oppose attempts by Nasser to expand his influence. 
When one Senator questioned Dulles on the need for unilateral ac-
tion by the United States rather than the United Nations in event of 
overt aggression in the Middle East, Dulles replied: " ••• the United 
Nations does not freeze the political status quo. 1140 It appears that 
Dulles meant that the United Nations could not guarantee existing 
governments in the Middle East but that the United States might. Secre-
tary Dulles testified that President Nasser had not gained in prestige 
among the Arabs as a result of the Suez crisis. 41 On this point, Mr. 
. 42 Dulles was contradicted by newspaper reports, respected journalists 
such as Hanson W. Baldwin, 43 and even a former Ambassador to Egypt, 
44 Jefferson Caffery. As a former State Department official connnented: 
"Nasser has become in the eyes of most Arabs a modern Saladin. More 
than any other man, he has restored Arab independence and dignity. 1145 
39 Campbell, pp. 77-78. 
Ann Williams, Britain and France in the Middle East and North 
Africa (New York, 1968), p. 122. - - - -
William R. Polk, The United States .!ill!.~ ~ World (Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, 1965), p. 210. 
40u.s. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal En~ Middle East, 
p~ 57. 
41Ibid., p. 350. 
4~ew ~Times, January 4, 1957, p. 5. 
431bid·., January 2, 1957, P• 1. 
44 U.S. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal En the Middle~' 
pp. 776-777. 
45Richard Nolte and William R. Polk, "Toward a Policy for the Mid-
dle East", Foreign Affairs, Val. XXXVI, No. 4 (July, 1958), p. 652. 
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Yet, Dulles said that this "modern Saladin" had little influence in the 
Middle East, a statement which Dulles himself contradicted by mention-
ing that the Eisenhower Doctrine was formulated in December, 1956, the 
time when Nasser was at the height of his prestige and influence among 
h A b 1 f h S . . 46 t e ra s as a resu t o t e uez crisis. 
The inclusion of economic aid under the Doctrine and its projected 
uses presents another indication that the Eisenhower Doctrine was 
oriented against President Nasser. As previously mentioned, the Ray-
burn substitute resolution was rejected by the President and Secretary 
Dulles because it included no economic or military assistance programs. 
President Eisenhower, in a press conference, was asked whether the eco-
nomic portion of the Resolution was essential to the document as a 
whole. The President said that the economic aid was a vital part of the 
Resolution; the United States could not "wage the peace" by force of 
47 
arms alone. In the Senate Hearings, Secretary Dulles testified that 
Egypt and Syria would not be allowed to participate in the aid pro-
gram~8 and it was possible that the economic portion of the document 
49 
could be used as a penalty against them. Dulles' statement, at least 
in regard to Egypt, concurs with a similar statement by Eisenhower in 
50 his book, Waging Peace. When questioned about the specific uses of 
46u.s. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal~ the Middle East, 
p. 107. 
47united States, Public Paper of the Presidents of the United 
States: .Dwight Q.. Eisenhower - 1957, p. 78. 
48u.s. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal~ the Middle East, 
p. 24. 
49Ibid., p. 145. 
SOE. h isen ower, p. 30. 
the aid, Dulles was unable to give any inclination cancer! 
position of the funds. Senator Fulbright was particularl) 
the prospect of spending foreign aid money with no specif~ 
i 
mind and he suggested that the Resolution be tabled until the Depart-
ment of State gave a full accounting of its Middle Eastern activities 
during the period 1947-1956. 51 Another witness, Joseph C. Green, the 
former Ambassador to Jordan, was quite frank concerning the spending of 
the $200 mi.lliom 
As far as spending $200 million between now and June 
out there is concerned, the Administration may have some 
specific projects that I have never heard of, but I know 
of no way that that could be done in that space of time 
except by simply handing it out.52 · 
What is evident at this point is that the President wanted com-
plete discretion to spend $200 million in the Middle East for projects 
which were not formulated. It was obvious that neither Egypt nor Syria. 
would receive any of this aid and that, in all likelihood, it would be 
used to support the opposition of these countries. The United States 
was not likely to give away money without receiving something in return 
from the recipient state. In this case, it is reasonable to assume that 
the economic aid of the Eisenhower Doctrine was designed to be used as 
a "bribe" to secure a pledge from specific political leaders in the 
Middle East to resist President Nasser. 
This idea is strengthened by the visit of King Saud of Saudi 
~rabia to the United States in January, 1957. King Saud, although 
r4ler of an extremely rich nation, was a relatively insignifica~t 
51uaS. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal .2E. the.Middle~' 
p~ 219. 
52Ibid., PP• 674-675. 
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political force in the Middle East, 53 and his regime was probably the 
most reactionary in the entire region. King Saud had refused to allow 
any Jew to enter Saudi Arabia and this ban was applicable even to Jew-
ish personnel of the United States Air Force which operated the Dhahran 
air base. This Saudi Arabian policy antagonized many citizens in the 
54 United States, yet the Eisenhower Administration rolled out the red 
carpet and welcomed Saud as a 11conquering hero" when he visited the 
United States. King Saud told President Eisenhower that for the Doc-
trine to be successful, it must be as advantageous to the Arabs as Nas-
I l" 55 ser s po icy. This report increases the suspicion that the economic 
portion of the Doctrine was in reality a ivbribe". More importantly, 
the treatment that Saud received while in the United States indicated 
that the United States planned to use him as its political instrument 
in the Middle East. This point was later substantiated by President 
56 Eisenhower in his memoirs. King Saud did not make any formal conunit-
ment to the Doctrine but he did agree to explain it to other Arab lead-
ers and, in return, the King received additional military aid from the 
the United States. 57 
The belief that the Doctrine's primary purpose was to isolate 
President Nasser from the rest of the Arab world was held by some 
53Ho B. Sharabi, Governments and Politics of the Middle East in 
the Twentieth Century (New York,·· 19·&2), p. 241.- -- --- --
54E · h 114 1.sen ower, p. • 
55 Gerald De Gaury, Faisal~ King of Saudi Arabia (New York; 1967), 
p. 78. 
56E. h isen ower, p. 116. 
57 De Gaury, p. 83. 
Senators in 1957. Senator Ervin indicated what he believed to be the 
real purpose of the Eisenhower Doctrine~ 
The truth is, Mr. President, that the testimony offered 
in support of the resolution makes it so plain that he who 
runs may read and not err in so doing, thi::i.t this is a.resolu-
tion advocated by the Secretary of State for the purpose of 
making the United States a policeman for the countries of the 
Middle East.58 
40 
During the Hearings, Secretary of State Dulles defended the refusal of 
the United States to join the Baghdad Pact by arguing that it would in-
volve the United States in Arab politics. 59 Senator Ervin noted a pos-
sible result of the Resolution~ 
Mr. President, I submit that if the United States is 
going to attempt to maintain the status quo in the .countries 
of the Middle East insofar as their present governments are 
concerned, Uncle Sam will be sticking his nose into Arab 
politics with a vengeance.60 
Senator Ellender of Louisiana also criticized the Doctrine and 
mentioned what he believed the Resolution would do~ 
There is only one. thing the resolution would do. It 
would permit the President to use American troops to de-
fend a Middle East country from attack by another Middle 
East country ••• 61 
During the latter stages of debate in the Senate and almost im-
mediately after the Resolution was signed by the President, a number of 
incidents occurred which were significant in identifying the policy 
which the United States would pursue in regard to President Nasser of 
58 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 1st Session, 
February 20, 1957, p. 2313. 
59 u .. s. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal .2E, the Middle East, 
p. 344. 
60uoSo Congress, Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 1st Session, 
February 20, 195_7, p. 2314. 
61Ibid., February 27, 1957, p. 2690. 
Egypt. The first incident concerned a Vice-Presidential fact-finL 
mission to Africa and the Middle East. While Vice-President Nixon 
visited many of Egypt's neighboring states and, more specifically, 
three nations at odds with Nasser (Sudan, Libya, and Ethiopia), he did 
not visit Egypt. Furthermore, Nixon had not requested a visit to 
62 Egypt. It seems incredible that an individual would go on a fact-
finding trip in the Middle East so soon after the Suez crisis and not 
visit Egypt. The only possible explanation was that the United States 
was attempting to ignore Nasser. 
The second·i.ncident or, more precisely, series of incidents oc-
curred less than a month after the Joint Resolution was adopted by the 
Congress and signed by President Eisenhower. Throughout March, King 
Saud received vi.sits from various Middle Eastern leaders. Curiously, 
all of these individuals had a pro-Western bent in their foreign poli-
cies. First to visit Saud was President Chamoun of Lebanon, who was 
followed by Ki.ng Faisal of Iraq, and then the Shah of Iran. It was re-
ported that informed circles in Arab countries were reportedly talking 
about a major realignment in the process of being formed which would 
result in a better understanding with the United States. These in-
formed individuals also stated that a closer understanding between for-
mer rivals King Saud and King Faisal could mean a vital change in the 
position of Saudi Arabia in the Middle East and this would, in turn, 
weaken President Nasser. 63 These visits to King Saud indicate that 
there was some realignment bei.ng considered in the Middle East. The 
6 ~ew .Y.2!1 Times, March 5, 1957, P• 5. 
631bid., March 28, 1957, p. 4. 
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visit of Faisal was of particular interest in this regard because Saud 
and Faisal had previously been involved in territorial disputes. The 
visit of Saud to the United States and then, less than two months 
later, the visits of three important Middle East leaders to Saudi 
Arabia, one innnediately following the other, were too coincidental to 
have occurred without some preparation. Perhaps more importantly, 
President Nasser was not involved in any of these meetings. 
Finally, another incident concerns the efforts of the United 
States to distribute the economic aid allocated under the Doctrine. 
President Eisenhower had appointed James P. Richards as a Special Am-
bassador whose purpose was to explain the Doctrine to the Middle East 
nations and parcel out grants or loans to those nations which accepted 
the Doctrine. Richards toured fifteen nations but did not visit Egypt, 
Syria, or Jordan. When he returned, Richards gave an address in which 
he explained his reasons for not visiting the three nations. Richards 
said that Egypt had offered no firm invitation for him to visit; Syria 
had presented a scrap of paper which implied that he would be welcome 
but that the Government had clearly shown that there was no real desire 
j 
for frank and sincere discussions; and internal developments in Jordan 
64 
made it preferable to extend United States aid through other means. 
Ric~ards made it clear that only in Jordan would the United States make 
renewed attempts to provide economic assistance; Egypt and Syria were 
to be excluded. But then, Dulles had stated in the Hearings that the 
United States did not plan to permit either Egypt or Syria to 
64united States Department of State Bulletin, "Radio and Tele-
vision Address by Ambassador Richards", Vol. XXXVI, No. 935 (May 27, 
1957), p. 841. 
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participate in the program, so Richards needed some pretext for not 
visiting those countries. The Richards Mission succeeded only where he 
was preaching to the converted and Mr. Richards seems to have wanted to 
ensure that there would be no new converts. 
At. this point, it is necessary to summarize the position advanced 
in this chapter. Although the Doctrine was rationalized as a defense 
against communist ambitions in the Middle East, evidence has been pre-
sented which indicates that the communist threat was not particularly 
serious in the Middle East. On the other hand, President Nasser and 
the Pan-Arab movement did constitute a threat to the interests of the 
United States in the Middle East. This view is supported by the state-
meµts of Secretary of State Dulles, President Eisenhower, and Assistant 
Secretary of State William Rountree in which all three considered Nas-
ser's nationalism to be dangerous. Dulles' testimony in the Senate 
Hearings shows that the United States was not going to allow Egypt or 
Syria to participate in the aid program. Furthermore, the amount of 
aid appropriated by the Congress was not large enough to combat commu-
nist subversion generally, but it was adequate to serve as a "bribe" to 
those Ar.ab leaders who would promise not to support Nasser. Finally, a 
number of incidents occurring soon after the Doctrine was signed by the 
President shows that the United States was using King Saud as its po-
litical instrument in the Middle East while it ignored Nasser. Thus, 
the position of this study is that the Eisenhower Doctrine was primari-
ly oriented against President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. 
CHAPTER IV 
IMPACT OF THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE ON THE MIDDLE EAST 
Thus far it has been shown that Egypt, under President Nasser, was 
viewed as constituting the most immediate and major threat to the inter-
ests of the United States in the Middle East. In January, 1957, there 
were three Arab governments which were pursuing policies more or less 
compatible with the interests of the United States and thereby could be 
characterized as being at variance with President Nasser's position. 
Iraq was a member of the Baghdad Pact; Lebanon, under the leadership of 
President Camille Chamoun, was following a pro-Western policy; and 
Saudi Arabia also was friendly toward the United States. Furthermore, 
the response of the United States to the Suez crisis had improved its 
prestige in the region, if only slightly. Less than two years later, 
however, Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia were all nonaligned and the 
prestige of the United States was at its lowest in the Middle East. 
Some explanation must exist for this rapid turn of events, and since 
the only major Middle Eastern policy declaration of the United States 
was the Eisenhower Doctrine, a question can be raised concerning the 
relationship between the implementation of the Doctrine and the nega-
tive response toward the United States by several Arab states. 
In attempting to gauge the Arab reaction to the Eisenhower Doc-
trine, it should be noted that the Arabs had never forgotten the Suez 
44 
45 
experience. 1 The West, in Arab minds, had proved that it had the will 
to use force to achieve its ends and many Arabs believed that the 
United States was committed to Western interests and was pursuing poli-
cies which the Arabs identified with past Anglo-French imperialist con-
2 trol. It was clear that the Arabs were going to compare any action on 
the part of the United States with the acts committed by Great Britain 
and France. The United States, therefore, was forced to attempt to 
promote Western interests and yet disassociate itself from Great Bri-
tain and. France. The fact that Great Britain and France welcomed the 
Eisenhower Doctrine and the initiative of the United States in the Mid-
3 dle East made the Doctrine immediately suspect by the Arab national-
. 4 ists. 
Initial reaction to the Eisenhower Doctrine was mixed; Syria was 
5 
adamantly opposed from the first hint of its coming, while Lebanon and 
Iraq welcomed a more active involvement by the United States in the 
Middle East. 6 The Baghdad Pact endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine, but 
7 
this was to be expected. In Jordan, the Foreign Minister rejected the 
1 John S. Badeau, The American Approach to the Arab World (New 
York, 1968), p. 6. 
2Ibid., P• 10. 
3NewYork Ti.mes, January 1, 1957, p. 2. 
4Ibid., p. 1. 
5Ibid. 
6Ibid., p. 3. 
7nBaghdad Pact Statement on the Eisenhower Doctrine", Middle 
Eastern Affairs, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (March, 1957), pp. 109-110. 
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Eisenhower assertion8 that a vacuum existed in the Middle East and in-
sisted that even if a vacuum had existed, it was filled by the Arabs 
9 themselves. President Nasser did not i.nnnediately connnent on the Doc-
trine. Observers noted that he seemed to be waiting until the Congres-
10 
sional consideration had been completed. Some early reactions from 
Arab countries were misleading because of the manner in which the Doc-
trine had been announced. Alfred Lilienthal testified at the Senate 
Hearings that the earliest cabled reports from Arab correspondents in 
New York spoke of a "United States mandate" over the Middle East. 11 As 
a generalization, it appeared that the anti-Western Arabs would oppose 
h D b ff h A b . 1. 12 t e octrine as an attempt to uy o t e ra nat1ona 1sts. 
While the Doctrine was primarily aimed at Egypt, President Nasser 
was a watchword of restraint. While not outwardly antagonized by the 
Doctrine, he seemed to be seriously worried about its possible impact 
upon his position in the Arab world. In January, 1957, he convened a 
conference in Cairo including King Hussein of Jordan, King Saud of 
Saudi Arabia, and Premier Assali of Syria reportedly for the purpose of 
discussing means to prevent his possible isolation from the rest of the 
178. 
8Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-1961 (New York, 1965), p. 
9New York Times, January 3, 1957, p. 3. 
lOibid., January 5, 1957, P• 6. 
11u .. So Congress, Senate, President 1 s Proposal £!!. the Middle East, 
Hearings before the Connnittee on Foreign Relations and Connnittee on 
Armed Services. 85th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C., 1957), 
pp. 572-573. 
1 ~ew York Times, January .5, 1957, p. 1. 
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13 Arab world. In addition, Nasser wished to keep the Arab Bloc united 
in its relationship with the West. 14 The participants agreed upon a 
subsidy plan for Jordan and then adjourned without making a joint state-
ment about the Doctrine. 
King Saud left this meeting to officially visit the United States. 
In Washington, he agreed to explain the Doctrine to the other Arab 
leaders in the Middle East. By doing this, Saud indicated support for 
15 
the Doctrine, if not explicitly, at least implicitly. After his 
visit to the United States, he traveled to Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia; 
in each country he explained the purpose of the Eisenhower Doctrine. 
He met with President Nasser, President Kuwatly of Syria, and King Hus-
sein in late February, 1957. King Saud told the other Arab leaders 
that the United States recognized that there were two sides to the Is-
l . . 16 d h . . . d . l' rae i question an t at it was not antagonistic towar nationa ism as 
long as it was not oriented toward the interests of the Soviet Union. 17 
Saud was innnediately challenged by Nasser and Kuwatly, both of whom re-
fused to abandon their policies of nonalignment or to denounce the 
S . u . 18 oviet nion. The conference adjourned without the issuance of a 
13Ibid., January 19, 1957, p. 1. 
Georgiana G. Stevens, ed., The United States 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964), p. 165. 
14New York Times, January 19, 1957, p. 3. 
and the Middle East 
15United States Department of State Bulletin, "Joint Connnunique on 
Visit to Washington of King Saud", Vol. XXXVI, No. 992 (February 25, 
1957), pp. 42-44. 
16 . 
~York Times, February 26, 1957, p. 1. 
17Ibid., p. 8. 
18Gerald De Gaury, Faisal: King of Saudi Arabia (New York, 1967), 
p. 84. 
statement on the Eisenhower Doctrine, a fact which particularly an-
19 
noyed President Kuwatly. Nasser, also, was becoming suspicious of 
King Saud. Saud's appearance as an emissary of the United States, 
coupled with the military aid which he had recently received from the 
United States and his position in the conference, seemed to have con-
. d N h h U . d S · · 1 h" 20 v1nce asser t at t e nite tates was attempting to 1so ate 1m. 
Before the Richards Mission left for the Middle East, an article 
in ~ Economist warned~ 11There is no evidence that the Arab states 
48 
will join the western camp to get aid. There is much to indicate that 
they will resist the West more strongly if excluded for political rea-
21 
sons from getting aid offered to others. 11 This warning was to be-
come a prophecy. In his tour of fifteen nations, Richards received 
..,,,,, . .,., · conunitments of support against conununist aggression from thirteen na-
tions, although only Lebanon publicly and specifically supported the 
Eisenhower Doctrine. Richards negotiated aid programs in nine coun-
triesg Lebanon, Libya, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Pakistan, 
22 Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. With the possible exception of Afghanistan, 
every one of the recipients had a pro-Western government. Of the $200 
million appropriated by the Congress, Richards parceled out $174 
19New York Times, February 26, 1957, p. 8. 
20Ibid., March 5, 1957, p. 1. 
21The Economist, ''Wrong Bait for Neutrals", Vol. CLXXXII, No. 5917 
(January 19, 1957), p. 194. 
22u.so Congress, House of Representatives, "First Report to the 
Congress Covering Activities Through June 30, 1957, in Furtherance of 
the Purposes of the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in 
the Middle East", House Miscellaneous Documents, 85th Congress, 1st 
Session (Washington, 1957), p. 1. 
23 
million, most of which was in the form of grants rather than loans. 
Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia are of particular importance to this 
study. Iraq's acceptance can be explained by its membership in the 
Baghdad Pact, an alliance which the United States had helped to es-
tablish. Saudi Arabia's acceptance can be explained by King Saud 1 s 
fear of communist penetration and his vision of becoming a leader of 
49 
24 the Arab world. Lebanon, under the government of President Chamoun, 
had actively pursued pro-Western policies and the President was a per-
1 f . d f E" h 25 sona rien o isen ower. 
There were three Arab nations which did not receive any of the 
economic aid offered under the Eisenhower Doctrine: Egypt, Syria, and 
Jordan. Other than the fact that it was doubtful that Secretary of 
State Dulles would ever have permitted Egypt and Syria to receive aid 
under the Doctrine, the governments of these nations believed that the 
United States was attempting to establish itself as the protector of 
26 
the Middle East in much the same way as the British had done. Fur-
thermore, the Doctrine implicitly demanded a public condemnation of the 
communist "menace" by the recipient state. To the Arab nationalists, 
this was anathema because the Soviet Union was aiding them in their 
conflict with Israel. When Israel accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine and 
Richards visited there, this further strengthened the suspicions of the 
23The Economist, "Doctrine At Work", Vol. CLXXXIV, No.· 5951 (Sep-
tember 14, 1957),:p. 829. 
24H.B. Sharabi, Governments and Politics of the Middle East in the 
Twentieth Century (New York, 1962~pp. 240-241:" ~ ------ --- ----
25E. h isen ower, p. 265. 
26New York Times, January 1, 1957, p. 1. 
Arab nationalists. In his role as "male Cleopatra" (as former 
tary of State Dean Acheson characterized him), Nasser tried to f 
East off against the West in order to prevent either from becoming 
dominant in the Middle East and, thereby, facilitate his own objec-
tives. In 1957, the Soviet Union was the lesser evil because the 
United States had assumed Great Britain's former role of "protecting", 
the Middle East. This meant that the United States would be promoting 
those Middle Eastern governments which had pro-Western policies and 
this would frustrate Nasser's objectives. To pursue his own policies, 
Nasser was forced to denounce the Eisenhower Doctrine. The situation 
in Jordan was quite different. King Hussein acted in a manner which 
implied that he would accept the Doctrine, but his pro-Nasser govern-
ment prevented him from doing so. The United States recognized this 
and, for that reason, Ambassador Richards declared that it was prefer-
able that United States aid be extended through other means. 27 
It was evident that the United States was using its aid programs 
to reward its political supporters in the Middle East. The United 
States was making it economically more desirable for the Arab govern-
ments to be with it than against it. The fact that this was obvious, 
and that Egypt and Syria were being deliberately excluded for political 
reasons, created hostility among Arab nationalists. The Syrian Foreign 
Minister reported that Richards' statements about Syria's invitation 
had been considered an insult and proved that Syria could not deal with 
27united States Department of State Bulletin, 11Radio and Tele-
vision Address by Ambassador Richards", Vol. XXXVI, No. 935 (May 27, 
1957), p. 841. 
28 the United States. 
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While King Saud's visit to the United States and the Richards Mis-
sion might be considered the first steps in implementing the Doctrine, 
they were not the first attempts by the United States Government to im-
plement the Doctrine during a crisis situation. Between March, 1957, 
and July, 1958, the United States was faced with three crises in the 
Middle Eastg Jordan, in the spring of 1957; Syria, in the fall of 1957; 
and Lebanon, in the summer of 1958. In each of these crises, the United 
States took some form of action, although only in the Lebanese crisis 
did the United States resort to using its military forces. The Arab 
responses to these acts were to have significant repercussions on the 
prestige of the United States and the effectiveness of the Eisenhower 
Doctrine. 
The political situation in Jordan was characterized by internal 
dissension between the Palestinians, who comprised two-thirds of Jar-
clan's population and to whom Nasser represented the only Arab leader 
capable of retrieving their homeland, and the Bedouins, who were loyal 
K . H . 29 to ing ussein~ In the elections of 1956, the pro-Nasse.r national-
ists became the majority in Parliament and Sulaiman al-Nabulsi became 
Prime Minister. Nabulsi was a member of the pro-Nasser National 
Socialist Party and believed that Jordan, because it was a non-viable 
30 
state, should unite with Egypt. The Government formulated a pro-
Nasser, anti-Western policy which was successful in bringing about 
28New York Times, August 27, 1957, p. 3. 
29sharabi, pp. 185-186. 
30 . Ibid., P• 187. 
closer ties with Nasser. The Nabulsi regime conducted itself a 
though a parliamentary regime had in fact been established and t 
31 
was reduced to only a constitutional monarch. This situation 'l.vuld 
inevitably have caused friction, but the Jordanian crisis actually began 
over a foreign policy issue. Nabulsi favored the diplomatic recognition 
of the Soviet Union in order to procure economic aid. 32 In this mat-
ter, Nabulsi was attempting to follow the precedent established by the 
Egyptian Government in 1955 and the Syrian Government in 1956. King 
Hussein opposed diplomatic recognition or aid programs with the Soviet 
Union and, instead, wanted aid from the West, if there were not any 
33 
strings attached, or aid from his fellow Arab governments. In Febru-
ary, 1957, Hussein called Nabul~i' s a:ttention to :the danger of conun:unis:t 
,, , 
penetration. in Jordan and urged Nabulsi to mitigate cormnunist in-
. ... . ' 
fluence. 34 With Nabulsi 's views about the Soviet Union pa"ral leling 
those of Nasser, it was evident that the King and his Prime Mini.Ster 
were close to estrangement. 
The gap between the views of the King and the Prime Minister con-
tinued to widen after the Eisenhower Doctrine was signed by the Presi-
dent in March. Jordan had not accepted the Doctrine because it was 
politically not feasible to do so with the large pro-Nasser Palestinian 
population and with a pro-Nasser government. At the first indication 
that Jordan might seek closer ties with the United States, riots broke 
out in Armnan and other cities throughout Jordan. Hussein believed that 
31J.c. Hurewitz, Middle~ Politics: The Military Dimension (New 
York, 1969), p. 319. 
32Ibid., p. 320. 
33Ibid. 
34New ~Times, February 3, 1957, pp. 1, 22. 
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these riots had been instigated by President Nasser. 35 The straw that 
broke the camel's back was a speech by Nabulsi in which he contended 
that the Eisenhower Doctrine was an interference in Jordanian internal 
affairs and that regardless of the economic aid promises made by the 
United States Government, Jordan would continue to refuse to denounce 
h S . u . 36 t e oviet nion. Four days after this speech, Prime Minister Nabul-
si was dismissed and the nationalist Commander-in-Chief of the armed 
forces, General Abu Nuwar, was arrested for plotting against the King. 
After the dismissal of Nabulsi, King Hussein appointed a pro-
Western Cabinet which antagonized the Arab nationalists who believed 
that the King had gone too far to the right. 37 They unleashed a propa-
ganda campaign against him and, with Egyptian support, threatened 
street demonstrations and a general strike unless the new Prime Minis-
. d 38 ter re~igne • King Hussein blamed Nasser and Kuwatly for provoking 
the riots and warned them to moderate the inflamatory radio broadcasts 
about the Jordanian Government which were inciting the people to re-
bel. 39 Faced with the street mobs, the propaganda from Egypt, and the 
. 40 presence of a Syrian army regiment on Jordanian soil, Hussein acted 
to ensure the loyalty of his armed forces and sought assistance from 
King Saud, who placed at King Hussein's disposal all the Saudi troops 
35 96. Stevens, P• 
3~ew ~Times, April 7, 1957, P• 2. 
37Ibid., April 26, 1957, P• 4. 
38Ibid., April 24, 1957, P• i. 
39Ibid., April 23, 1957, P• 1. 
40Ibid., April 4, 1957, P• 1. 
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h . h th . J d 1 f h s . . 41 w 1c were en 1n or an as a resu t o t e uez cr1s1s. King Saud 
also began to extend financial assistance to Hussein. 42 With this sup-
port and another change in the Cabinet, the crisis subsided. 
It was evident that the Jordanian crisis was not caused by the 
conununists although conununist elements were probably a factor in in-
. 1 d . . 43 creasing an a rea y tense s1tuat1on. The major impetus came from the 
Arab nationalists encouraged by Nasser. The disputes between Nabulsi 
and Hussein were issues in which Hussein was in disagreement with Nas-
ser. The fact that an obviously pro-Nasser government was dismissed for 
a pro-Western government confirms that view. The radio propaganda 
against Hussein's pro-Western government came from Cairo rather than 
Moscow. It is true that Hussein had stated that Jordan was threatened 
b . t t" 1 . 44 b t h" . d"d fi"t th t 1 y 1n erna 1ona conunun1sm, u 1s statement 1 not e ac ua 
situation and it must be viewed as a means of obtaining aid from the 
United States rather than accurately describing the political situation 
in Jordan. This is substantiated by Hussein's statement of April 25, 
1957, in which he charged that the conspiracy to overthrow him was get-
45 ting its support from Egypt. An9ther indication that Hussein was at-
tempting to catch the attention of the United States were the reports 
that Hussein was looking for a formula similar to that of King Saud for 
41ne Gaury, p. 85. 
42New ~Times, April 12, 1957, p. 6. 
43George Lenczowski, The Middle ~ in World Affairs (Ithaca, New 
York, 1962), p. 678. 
44New York Times; Fe~ruary 3, 1957, p. 22. 
Ibid~pril 25, 19l7 p. 1. 
45Ibid., April 26, 1957, P• 2. 
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obtaining financial aid from the West without tying his country to any 
46 pact. 
The fact that the origin of Jordan's conflict stemmed from in-
ternal dissension and inter-Arab rivalry rather than from international 
communism posed a problem for the United States. The Eisenhower Doc-
trine could not be specifically used because it did not fit the situa-
tion; there was no overt communist aggression and Jordan had not ac-
cepted the Doctrine. On the other hand, the United States could not 
allow Jordan to fall into the hands of the Arab nationalists. Such an 
event would either prompt an Israeli attack to protect its borders or 
an inter-Arab war over the division of the spoils; both possibilities 
would create an uneasy situation in the Middle East and, therefore, 
47 
would endanger the interests of the United States. At one point, the 
United States Government announced that it was not under any commitment 
to defend Jordan, 48 but six days later, President Eisenhower authorized 
Presidential Pre.ss Secretary James Hagerty to say that the United States 
d d h d d d f J d . 1 49 regar e t e in epen ence an integrity o or an as vita • Eisen-
. 50 hower purposely used language similar to that of the Doctrine. The 
next day, President Eisenhower ordered the Sixth Fleet to sail into the 
Eastern Mediterranean Sea. The State Department press release announc-
ing the President's action read, in part: "Jordan is menaced by the 
46Ibid., April 19, 1957, P• 4. 
47E. h isen ower, p. 194. 
48New York Times, April 19, 1957, p. 1. 
49Ibid., April 25, 1957, p. 1. 
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f . f . . 1 . "51 orces o 1nternat1ona connnun1sm. In addition, the United States 
extended a $10 million grant to Jordan which, although not specifically 
attached to the Eisenhower Doctrine, was given, 11 ••• in recognition of 
the steps taken by His Majesty King Hussein and the Government and 
people of Jordan to maintain the integrity and independence of their 
nation.1152 Again, the language was such as to suggest that the Eisen-
hower Doctrine was being used in fact, if not in name. It appears that 
Hu.ssein was successful in obtaining aid from the United States without 
committing himself to any anti-communist pledge or to joining the 
Baghdad Pact. 
The crisis subsided rapidly after the action taken by the United 
States. Jordan was detached from the ranks of the Arab nationalists 
but it was done by abolishing political parties and suspending the 
Parliament. The Arab nationalists did not miss Eisenhower's choice of 
words in announcing that the United States would support Hussein. They 
realized that the Doctrine had been used and Nasser and Kuwatly charac-
. 53 
terized United States aid to Jordan as an attempt to buy the country. 
The United States lost prestige as a result of its actions during the 
crisis. The Arab nationalists could not see any distinction between a 
. 54 
British show of force and a United States show of force. The presence 
of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea was interpreted by the 
Arab nationalists as a provocative move to shore up King Hussein 
5~ew ~Times, April 26, 1957, p. 1. 
52Ibid., April 30, 1957, P• 1. 
53tbid., May 1, 1957, P• 3. 
5411The Middle East Since Suez", The World Today, Vol. XIII, No. 
12 (Pecember, 1957), p. 514. 
55 
regardless of the wishes of the people of Jordan. Furthermore, the 
use of the Sixth Fleet held the United States open to the charge of 
"gunboat diplomacy1156 reminiscent of its past and British colonial-
ism. 57 The suspicions of the Arab nationalists that the approach of 
the United States to the Middle East was anti-Nasser and anti-
nationalist seemed to be confirmed. 58 
57 
The United States had won the first round, but Nasser was not de-
feated. In June, 1957, King Saud and King Hussein met in Amman, os-
tensibly for the purpose of reaffirming their belief in neutralism. 
The communique issued from that meeting was denounced by the Syrian 
Defense Minister, Khaled al-Azm, who described the two monarchs as 
"tools of America11 •59 This attack upon Saud and Hussein indicated that 
a split was occurring in the Arab world and that Egypt and Syria were 
becoming isolated. This was further evidenced in the closer working 
relationships among Kings Saud, Hussein, and Faisa1, 60 the withdrawal 
of the Saudi ambassador from Damascus, and the refusal of Egypt and Sy-
ria to financially assist Jordan after they pledged that they would do 
61 
so. 
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The United States did not have to wait too long for the second 
round to begin--this time in Syria. In this crisis, it was the re-
sponse of the United States to the situation which precipitated the 
crisis. Syria had an extremely nationalist government controlled by 
the Ba 1athist Party. After President Nasser's arms agreement with the 
Soviet Union in 1955, Syria negotiated one in 1956. When the Eisen-
hower Doctrine was announced in 1957, Syria virulently denounced it and 
began to characterize the United States as an imperialist power. In 
July, 1957, it secured a loan for approximately $100 million from the 
Soviet -Onion and in addition negotiated a marketing agreement with the 
Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia for the sale of Syrian grain and cot-
62 ten. In August, the Syrian Government alleged that three United 
States Embassy officers were plotting against the government and ex-
pelled them. The State Department was quick to report that the manner 
in which the three officers were expelled indicated that Syria was mov-
ing closer to the Communist B lac. 63 The United States did not send its 
ambassador back to Damascus and the Syrian ambassador to the United 
64 States was declared to be persona .!.!£!!. grata. 
This incident was the start of the Syrian crisis. While the 
United States was concerned about the arms build up in Syria, some 
countries in the region were highly distressed about the turn of 
events in Syria. 65 Turkey was particularly worried about the 
62Ibid., p. 179. 
63New York Times, August 15, 1957, p. 4. 
64 Barraclough, p. 179. 
65E· h 197 1sen ower, p. • 
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possibility of a communist (or a communist sympathizing) government in 
Syria because it would then have a communist government on two of its 
borders. 66 Lebanon asked the United States for formal assurances of 
support in the event that Lebanon was attacked by Syria. 67 Other na-
tions in the area also expressed their concern to the United States. 
The first public response of the United States was to send Loy w. 
Henderson, a Department of State Middle Eastern expert, to the area to 
confer with United States ambassadors and the leaders of those nations 
concerned about the leftist tendencies of the Syrian Government and 
more importantly, the large arms shipments being sent to Syria from the 
Communist Bloc. Henderson met with leaders of Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq 
in Ankara, Turkey and then made a short trip to Lebanon where he con-
ferred with government officials there. These meetings were held in 
secret and for seven days the response of the United States to the re-
cent events was unknown. Significantly, Henderson made no effort to 
contact either Egyptian or Syrian officials and did not visit either 
68 
country. The Arab nationalists were suspicious of Henderson's real 
intentions and were therefore not too surprised when Henderson, upon his 
arrival in the United States, asserted that Syria's behavior jeopardized 
69 the "free world". In the wake of Henderson's report, the United 
States sent arms to Turkey and Iraq and rapidly accelerated its arms 
66New ~Times, August24, 1957, p. 4. 
67E. h 1sen ower, p. 197. 
68New ~Times, September 2, 1957, P• 1. 
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70 deliveries to Jordan and Lebanon. In addition, the Sixth Fleet was 
again ordered to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and State Department of-
71 ficials hinted that the Eisenhower Doctrine might be invoked. During 
this period of time, the number of Turkish troops stationed on the Sy-
rian border increased from thirty-two thousand to fifty thousand. 72 A 
short time after it was suggested that the Eisenhower Doctrine might be 
invoked, the Syrian Government charged that Turkey, with the collabora-
tion of the United States, was planning to invade Syria. On October 
15, 1957, Syria brought its complaint to the United Nations. This turn 
of events placed the United States on the defensive and even pro-
Western Arab governments hesitated in their support of the United 
73 States. 
The United States Government denied the allegation of the Syrian 
Government but Eisenhower's memoirs suggest that the United States was 
not as totally innocent as it led the world to believe in the United 
Nations debates. Eisenhower wrote that Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tur-
key had concluded that the Syrian regime had been subverted by the com-
munists and were prepared to take action that would overthrow the Sy-
rian Government. These countries asked President Eisenhower what the 
United States would do to help them. Eisenhower replied that if Syria's 
Moslem neighbors felt it necessary to take action, the United States 
70E.. h lsen ower, P• 202. 
71New York Times, September 6, 1957, p. 1. 
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would expedite shipments of arms already committed to the Middle East-
ern countries and, further, would replace losses as quickly as possible. 
In addition, the United States would ensure that no outside countries -
for example, Israel and the Soviet Union - would interfere with the 
measures taken by these Moslem nations to protect themselves from Sy-
ria. In the meantime, the President informed key Congressmen of the 
seriousness of the situation and alerted the "ready" forces of the 
armed forces, particularly the Strategic Air Command. Something went 
wrong, however, and first, Iraq withdrew from the plan, then King Hus-
sein left unexpectedly for a vacation in Italy, and King Saud, although 
never informed of the plan, became preoccupied with the Israeli dispute 
rather than addressing himself to the problems of Syria. This left 
Turkey and Lebanon; the latter nation was unable to initiate any mili-
tary action. 74 On September 19, 1957, Secretary of State Dulles de-
livered a speech before the United Nations General Assembly in which he 
declared that Turkey faced a growing military danger resulting from the 
major build up of Soviet arms in Syria. 75 This danger cited by Dulles 
was of doubtful validity. The Syrian army was about 50,000 strong, 
newly equipped, lacking in battle experience, and largely tied down 
along the Israel frontier whereas Turkey had one of the largest armies 
in NATO with 500,000 troops, many of whom had fought in Korea, and it 
was the best equipped military force in the Middle East. 76 Although it 
probably would be going too far to conclude from this information that 
74 . Eisenhower, pp. 197-203. 
75New York Times, September 20, 1957, p. 1. 
76Richard Nolte and William R. Polk, "Toward a Policy for the Mid-
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the United States was prepared to support aggression against Syria, the 
behavior of the United States Government suggests that it would not 
have been displeased had the Syrian Government been overthrown. 
The Syrian crisis was probably the turning point for the Eisenhower 
Doctrine. Throughout the crisis, the United States based its actions 
on the premise that Syria was becoming conununist-oriented. Yet, it was 
unable to prove that premise and the withdrawal of Arab support from 
the invasion plan indicates that the Syrian Government was actually 
ultra-nationalist. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and Egypt gain-
ed the opportunity to pin the label of aggression once again on the 
77 Western powers. In the General Assembly debates, Syria charged that 
the United States was intimidating the Syrian Government and that the 
Eisenhower Doctrine was a policy for "American intervention in the Mid-
78 dle East." One by one, the other Arab governments began to line up 
in support of Syria. The attempt of the United States to ostracize the 
Syrian Government in the name of anti-conununism contributed to a re-
newed sense of Arab unity which three months earlier was not evident. 79 
The crisis proved that even if a weak Arab state wrapped itself in the 
mantle of nationalism and Arab solidarity, there was little that the 
80 United States could do. 
The responses of the United States during the Syrian crisis did 
77 Malcolm Kerr, The~ Cold War l.2.:?.§.-1964 (London, 1965), p. 6. 
7811Assembly Debates Syrian Complaint Against Turkey", United!!-
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not produce the desired results. In its quest for stability in the 
Middle East, the United States actually contributed to the instability. 
Although it still held military superiority, the Soviet Union was able 
to gain influence which threatened that superiority. The military po-
sition of the United States and the threat to invoke the Eisenhower 
Doctrine were associated by the Arabs. This stimulated hostility among 
the Arabs toward the Doctrine. The Arabs became increasingly doubtful 
about the good intenttons of the United States and feared a move to in-
stall leaders who would be nominally independent but who, in fact, 
would be dependent upon and dominated by Washington. 81 To the Arabs, 
the United States manifested its imperialistic policies by sending the 
Sixth Fleet to the area, urging Arab to fight Arab, and attempting to 
"bribe" those nations not firmly committed to Nasser. The United 
States, like Great Britain before it, had proved that it had the will 
to use force to achieve its ends. When the coup in Syria failed to 
materialize, the popular conclusion among the Arabs was not that it had 
not been planned but that the United States had been forced to back 
82 down. It was in this atmosphere that the Eisenhower Doctrine became 
a subject for general scorn throughout the Middle East. Its associa-
tion, in Arab minds, with gunboat diplomacy, bribes, and puppet regimes 
made it a liability in the Middle East. The United States, however, 
did not recognize the liability of the Doctrine until after it had been 
used in one more crisis. 
81william Appleman Williams, America and ~Middle ~: Open 
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For a time, Middle East tensions eased. In early 1958, Egypt and 
Syria united and formed the United Arab Republic, to which the United 
States, after an acceptable period of time, extended diplomatic recog-
nition. Yemen later associated itself with this union to form the 
weak confederation of the United Arab States. President Eisenhower 
claimed that while the Arab: populations as a whole seemed to 
view the event as a first step toward the long-sought goal of Arab 
unity, Arab governments were fearful of this obvious elevation of Nas-
ser's influence and prestige. 83 At the encouragement of the State De-
partment and as an obvious response to the formation of the U.A.R., 
Iraq and Jordan formed a federation called the Arab Union which es-
sentially was a weak confederation in which both states retained their 
. 84 
sovereignty. 
New tensions arose in Lebanon during the spring and summer of 
1958. In 1943, Lebanon received its independence from France which 
controlled the area under a League mandate. Lebanon faced the problem 
of reconciling the great religious differences within the country by 
adopting the National Pact, an unwritten gentlemen's agreement. The 
Pact reserves the office of President to the Maronite Christians, that 
of the Prime Minister to the Sunni Moslems, and that of the Speaker of 
the House to the Moslem Shi'is. The National Pact further implied that 
in foreign relations, Lebanon was to remain neutral except in regional 
85 
matters. An example of this point was the Lebanese participation in 
83E. h isen ower, 
84Ibid. 
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te Arab League and its aid in prosecuting the war with Israel in 1948. 
The Lebanese crisis began to develop as early as 1956 when Presi-
mt Camille Chamoun failed to give active support to Egypt during t!J.e 
uez crisis and had offended the Arab nationalists even more by not 
evering diplomatic or trade relations with Great Britain and France. 
n 1957, Lebanon was the only Middle Eastern government which publicly 
.ccepted the Eisenhowe:r Doctrine, an act which many Lebanese considered 
86 ts a departure from the National Pact. The pro-Western stance of 
;hamoun's government antagonized many Moslems who wished to have closer 
87 
:ies with Nasser and the U.A.R. The dominant Sunni Moslem community 
in Syria, who envisaged Lebanon as part of Greater Syria, was also dis-
t t. d t th T.Y 1 • • 88 uroe a e pro-western po 1c1es. Syrian-Lebanese relations had 
been strained for over a year with minor incidents and disruption of 
.JI b h h h d • 1 89 traue etween t e two nations w ic occurre intermittent y. In 
April, 1958, all of these irritations surfaced when President Chamoun 
attempted to b1a re-elected. According to the Lebanese Con:stitution, 
the. President is ineligible for re-election and Chamoun' s prt~decessor 
h·ad been forc.ed to resign because he had attempted to perpetuate him:-
self in officf!. Yet, Chamoun indicated that he would seek an.other 
term. This became the issue which provoked violence in Lebanon and 
which, in turn, involved the United States under the Eisenhower Doc-
trine. 
86 Stevens, p. 169. 
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88H ' 389 urewitz, p. • 
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The violence began with a riot which destroyed the United States 
Information Service's Library in Tripoli. The Government of Lebanon 
blamed a "foreign Arab power" for the disturbances and reported that 
hundreds of Syrian nationalists were infiltrating Lebanon to subvert 
. 90 
the government. The United States charged that Nasserites and corn-
. . bl f h . · L b 91 rnunists were responsi e or t e riots in e anon. As disturbances 
within Lebanon increased in number and violence, President Charnoun 
66 
mobilized the Lebanese army and formally charged the United Arab Re-
92 public with attempting to subvert the government of Lebanon. Presi-
dent Nasser denied Charnoun's accusation and assured the United States 
93 
that he was not responsible for the events occurring in Lebanon. The 
United States Department of State officials were unimpressed by Presi-
dent Nasser's denial and said that no nation would claim agents operat-
. . h . 94 ing in anot er nation. This, of course, implied that Nasser was ly-
ing. 
While General Chehab, Lebanese Commander-in-Chief of the armed 
forces, led attempts to mediate between members of the Government and 
the opposition, President Nasser threatened to unleash Arab "volun-
teers" to protect Lebanon if President Charnoun called on foreign troops 
to crush the Lebanese rebellion. 95 The United States, referring to 
90Ibid.' May 12, 1958, P• 2. 
91Ibid 0 , May 13, 1958, P• 1. 
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Nasser's threat, charged that Nasser had admitted his guilt fomenting 
Lebanon's troubles and called for observers from the United Nations to 
be sent to Lebanon to determine whether infiltration of men and arms 
. 96 
was occurring. 
By the end of June and the early part of July, the situation began 
to cool. One reason for this was President Chamoun's public announce-
. 97 
ment in the early part of July that he was not·seeking re-election. 
This robbed the opposition of one of its major issues. The United 
States, at this point, was attempting to assure President Chamoun of its 
strong support without becoming actively involved. Unexpected help for 
the forces of non-intervention came from the Pentagon where military ex-
perts strongly opposed a unilateral military action by the United 
States in Lebanon because of the strong possibility of guerrilla war-
98 fare. On the political front, Secretary of State Dulles was also 
indicating that the United States had no intention of intervening in 
99 Lebanon. Even when the United Nations Observation Group reported 
that they could find no evidence of Syrian infiltration into Lebanon 
d h h d . b . L b . . 1 lOO h U . d an t at t e istur ance in e anon was a civi war, t e nite 
States questioned the report but took no overt action. In Lebanon, the 
number of incidents tapered off and it appeared that the situation was 
becoming stabilized. 
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Then two events occurred within three days of each other which 
changed the Middle East situation. On July 12, King Hussein uncovered 
a plot to assassinate him which was led by sixty army officers. Hus-
sein believed that the plot had been financed and directed by the 
Uni.ted Arab Republi"c. 101 Th d d' i I e secon event was a coup etat n raq. 
The coup was engineered by pro-Nasser forces who acted when rumors 
spread that King Faisal intended to order the army to attack Syria in 
102 
support of the Lebanese government. The United States knew that 
many Iraqi army officers were influenced by Nasser's views and the 
army coup led by pro-Nasser officers, the assassination plot in Jordan, 
and the events in Lebanon, did not appear to be isolated incidents but 
pointed to an attempt by Nasser to eliminate his opposition. The United 
States Government could not help but believe that the Middle East situ-
ation was deteriorating. If pro-Nasser forces were successful in Leba-
non and Jordan, the influence of the United States in the Middle East 
would be greatly reduced. Even Saudi Arabia could no longer be counted 
on to give the United States support because. in April, King Saud had 
been forced to abdicate much of his power to his brother, Crown Prince 
F . 1 h f d 1 . . h P "d N l03 If N aisa , w o avore c oser ties wit resi ent asser. asser 
was successful, the Soviet penetration of the Middle East would have 
increased and the military primacy of the United States would be 
threatened. Furtherniore, the flow of Middle Eastern oil to Europe 
would be threatened if pro-Nasser governments were in control of the 
lOlibid., July 13, 1958, P• 23. 
102F.R.C. Bagley, "Iraq's Revolution", International.Journal, Vol. 
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bridge, Massachusetts, 1965), p. 211. · ~ ---- ----
See also, Eisenhower, p. 264. 
69 
Eastern Mediterranean region. The position of the United States in the 
region under these circumstances would be in serious difficulty. 
Acting upon this reasoning, the President ordered elements of the 
United States Marines to land in Beirut "to protect American lives and 
by their presence there to encourage the Lebanese government in defense 
104 
of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity." In addition, President 
Eisenhower asked Robert Murphy, a distinguished ambassador, to attempt 
to resolve the crisis in Lebanon. Murphy recorded that.Eisenhower 
. 105 
cited the basis for sending troops as the Eisenhower Doctrine. The 
next day, Great Britain sent troops to Jordan to protect King Hussein's 
government. 
The crisis ended with the inauguration of the new President of 
Lebanon, General Chehab, and with the realization that the revolution-
ary leader of Iraq, General Kassim, was not as pro-Nasser as originally 
thought. It is interesting that the United States strongly supported 
106 . the election of General Chehab even though he had opposed the United 
States' intervention and once elected, he appointed a Cabinet recruited 
107 
almost wholly among the former rebels. The Chehab government re-
affirmed Lebanon's traditional foreign policy of nonalignment except in 
regional affairs. This, then, was a setback for the policy of the 
United States in the Middle East. 
104 United States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIX, No. 997 
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In assessing the part of the United States in the Lebanese crisis, 
it is significant that President Eisenhower told the Congress that"··· 
the avowed purpose of the rebels was to overthrow the legally consti-
tuted Government of Lebanon and to install by violence a government 
which would subordinate the independence of Lebanon to the policies of 
the United Arab Republic. 11108 Yet, in his memoirs, Eisenhower said: 
"Behind everything was our deep-seated conviction that the Connnunists 
were principally responsible for the trouble, and that President Chamoun 
. d 1 b f l' f . . ,,lo9 was motivate on y y a strong ee ing o patriotism. · These state-
ments can only be rationalized by assuming that President Nasser was 
either a connnunist or a connnunist-sympathizer. There were indications 
that this was exactly what President Eisenhower believedllO but this 
belief was never substantiated by him. The events in Lebanon, as in 
Jordan and Syria, were caused by Arab nationalists, not the connnunists. 
President Chamoun blamed Nasser and the United Arab Republic for the 
intervention in his country. The United Nations Observation Group re-
ported that the violence in Lebanon was the result of a civil war among 
the Arabs in that country. Hanson Baldwin reported that Lebanon was un-
able to prove that the principal threat to its security came from beyond 
its borders, especially when the rebels were not well-equipped and the 
army was not using its full force against them. As a matter of fact, 
General Chehab had refused to act even after President Chamoun had 
108united States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIX, No. 
997 (August 4, 1958), p. 182. 
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ordered him to attack the rebels. 111 It must therefore be concluded 
that the United States acted against Arab nationalists rather than com-
munists. 
The general Arab response to the actions of the United States dur-
ing the Lebanese crisis was unfavorable. The United States fulfilled 
the expectations of the Arabs when it supported a regime antagonistic 
to the cause of Arab nationalism. The presence of United States armed 
forces on Arab soil less than two years after the United States Govern-
ment condemned Great Britain and. France for sending their troops to 
Egypt resulted in hostility among the Arabs. The Suez and Lebanese 
crises developed under different circumstances but many Arabs were un-
bl h d . . . 112 a e to see t e istinction. The United States, in 1958, found it-
self in much the same position that Great Bri.tain did in 1956. 
At the beginning of this chapter, it was noted that the United 
States had to find a way to protect its interests in the Middle East 
and yet disassociate itself in Arab minds from Great Britain and France. 
It was never able to accomplish this. Perhaps it was hopeless from the 
first in the sense that the Middle Eastern interests of the United 
States and Great Britain were similar. Instead of the British navy 
patrolling the Mediterranean, it was the Sixth Fleet of the United 
States. Instead of British subsidies, it was the United States that 
offered economic and military aid. However, this aid was extended only 
to those nations whose foreign policies were compatible with that of 
the United States. Instead of British paternalism and support of 
11~ew York Times, June 26, 1958, p. 8. 
112 Campbell, p. 144. 
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dependent colonial monarchies, the United States was extending support 
to governments in the region. Arab nationalists, however, viewed these 
governments as reactionary and dependent. The British had their Suez, 
the United States had Lebanon. In these circumstances, it is not 
difficult to see why the Arabs were unable to distinguish between Bri-
tish policies and the policies of the United States. 
The United States in the 1957-1958 period attempted to maintain 
the status quo. In Jordan, in Syria, and in Lebanon, the United States 
opposed the forces of change. The stock solution for any disturbance 
in the Middle East was to blame the communists and then invoke the 
Eisenhower Doctrine. The result was that the Arabs and their govern-




Less than a month after President Eisenhower ordered troops into 
Lebanon, Senator J. William Fulbright, in a Senate address, said: "The 
Administration might well review the validity of the concept of the 
Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine. If these are as worthless as 
I believe them to be, it is high time they were reconsidered and aban-
1 doned." In December, 1969, Senators Mike Mansfield of Montana and 
Charles Mathias of Maryland introduced Senate Joint Resolution 166 
which would repeal the Eisenhower Doctrine and three other foreign poli-
cy resolutions. The State Department, asked to comment on the Resolu-
tion, informed Senator Fulbright that much of the Eisenhower Doctrine 
was no longer relevant and that " ••• as a functional matter, these reso-
lutions have no continuing significance in the foreign policy formula-
tion process •••• " 2 On May 1, 1970, the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee voted to terminate the Eisenhower Doctrine. The expected repeal 
of the Eisenhower Doctrine by the Congress indicates that it no longer 
promotes the interests of the United States. 
1Tristram Coffin, Senator Fulbright~ Portrait of a Public Philos-
opher (New York, 1966), p. 127. 
2United States Congress, Senate, Termination of Middle East and 
Southeast Asia Resolutions, Report of the Committee on Foreign Re-




This study attempted to determine the reasons for the failure of 
the Eisenhower Doctrine to promote the interests of the United States. 
It was found that a primary reason for its failure was its attempt to 
isolate Egypt unde! President Nasser from the other Arab states. The 
United States failed to realize that Nasser was a symbol of Arab as-
pirations. By attempting to isolate him, the United States sought to 
remove Egypt as a threat to its interests in the Middle East. Nasser 
was regarded as the leader of the Arab nationalists and the United 
States considered the nationalists to be a disruptive force in the Mid-
dle East. Nasser had permitted the Soviet Union to penetrate the Mid-
dle East, and had nationalized the Suez Canal, a major artery for 
transporting oil to Europe, and he had urged the overthrow of Arab 
governments which followed pro-Western policies. The United States 
Government believed that, by.isolating Egypt from the other Arab states, 
it would increase its bargaining position and thereby force Nasser to 
come to terms. 
The study further found that the attempts by the United States to 
implement the Doctrine caused the Arabs to become alienated from the 
United States. The United States underestimated the appeal of Arab 
nationalism and failed to fully assess the impact of Great Britain's 
"imperialistic" policies upon the Arab governments. It was not lost 
upon either the Arab nationalists or the Soviet Union that the United 
States; by attempting to build up the influence of King Saud, was sup-
porting one of the most reactionary governments in the Middle East. 
Likewise, the United States was identified by the Arab nationalists 
with Western policies they did not like and this tended to increase 
their suspicions. The United States, by refusing to extend economic 
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aid to Egypt and Syria, had indicated that it was following a policy 
similar to that of Great Britain 1 s "di vi de and rule" policy. When the 
Doctrine was invoked during the Jordanian and Syrian crises, it was 
clear that the United States was doing so to oppose the Arab national-
ists. This is why after the Syrian crisis, many Arabs became increas-
ingly doubtful about the good intentions of the United States in the 
region. They feared that the United States was attempting to establish 
puppet regimes. The Lebanese crisis appeared to confirm these fears. 
The Arabs believed that the United States intervened against the Arab 
nationalists in order to support a government which had lost its appeal 
among the people. The Arabs compared the United States intervention in 
Lebanon with the British invasion of Egypt in 1956. Because of the 
association of the Eisenhower Doctrine with the former British policies 
in the region, the Arabs became hostile toward the United States. 
Finally, the study found that the Eisenhower Doctrine served to 
endanger the national interests of the United States in the Middle East. 
Rather than isolating Egypt from the other Arab states, it practically 
isolated the United States from the Middle East. It cut the lines of 
communication between the United States and the Arab nationalists and 
it seriously weakened the position of those governments which had been 
friendly to the United States. The Doctrine served to increase the 
Soviet penetration of the Middle East and, thereby, posed a threat to 
the future United States military primacy in the region. It left Nas-
ser in stronger control of the major petroleum arteries to Europe, 
which placed him in a much more favorable bargaining position than he 
had before 1957. Finally, it impede.cl attempts to promote among Arab 
governments foreign policies favorable to the Western bloc because of 
the increased hostility resulting from the Eisenhower Doctrine. 
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